Документальный Фильм 1941 Битва за Киев

Станьте спонсором канала,
и вы получите доступ к эксклюзивным бонусам.
Подробнее:

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLNSCyJWPiKHuqSz7Tl5oeg/join

Год выпуска: 2025
Выпущено: Литва
Режиссер: Angel-Tadas
Жанр: Военный Документальный

Документальный Фильм 1941 Битва за Киев

22 июня 1941 года началась Великая Отечественная война …

Здесь узнаете:

Вы согласны, что войну выиграл Сталин?
А если бы война закончилась победой Гитлера, то что – населению стало бы лучше?
Так за что же, по-вашему, воевали советские люди?
Как Советский Союз победил в войне.
Почему немцы непослы на Москву?
Могла ли Германия победить?

все эти вопросы мы ответим в этом фильме.

В Документальном Фильме 1941 Битва за Киев
использованы фрагменты фильмов:
Сто дней свободы, По зову сердца, немецкая и русская документальная хроника.

Hey, du halt an. Ausweis. What’s the matter? More documents. I’ve already shown you. Do you have an Avag for the bike? What do you mean take the paper? This is my bike. Permission to ride a bike. Listen, I understand. The conversation is short. Permission to take the bag. Go ahead, go ahead, take it. And now what? Contact the police station. There will be permission, you can take the bike. We’re stretching out and leaving here. The first calculation is left for me. spending go Krasno leads the enemy in a battle equal to which never before repelling an attack in different planes on ours on Vyacheslav Fyodorovich you can’t send me combat commander Vlupich I should be here at the front passes along A Drink would at least be given the road. Come on, hold on, guys. Just dissolve. Don’t swallow. Sugar helps on a long journey. Holding up. Thank you. Stop, brake the car. The air is forced. Get up quickly, [ __ ] My happy ones. Hey, San, San, slow down. Stop, you stop. Deity of the dear and beloved. When millions of people return not to their homes, but to the ashes, and looking back they do not recognize either the streets, or the villages, or the cities, and will never find those to whom their hearts aspired, only then will humanity see what a terrible path it has gone through, into what an abyss of indescribable suffering, poverty, grief and irreparable losses the vile otorman of German militant imperialism Hitler has plunged it. And looking around, among the ruins, blood, smoke, democracy and culture were given, how horror and the darkness of despair paralyzed Europe, how the blue-eyed, two-legged cattle from the Hitlerite peoples walked through it. Germany of scoundrels really became an iron boot and got out. Here they are, the Hitlerite scoundrels. Here is the shame of humanity. Look, hate and modernity. Black smoke rose above our land to the very sky, like a menacing call for revenge. Who will forget it? Who will forget how our fields burned? How people were torn apart by iron, and the stench of corpses hung over our land. Here they are, the dead, crawling on our land, knocking on the door, on the windows, on the soul. The chief bandit Goering himself wanders around Ukraine, looking for happiness on our land. Here he climbs into a hut, into the forest. Ukrainian people left for the east, were driven into the Toda, took away cars, blew up power plants, bridges and factories, factories. Nothing was spared. เฮ เฮ The cities of Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa heroically defended themselves. Almost half of the entire Romanian army found their death near Odessa. But under the pressure of German forces, the defenders of Odessa retreated. The retreat was covered by the cruiser Chervona Ukraina. The defenders of the Motherland retreated with a heavy feeling, carrying their most precious weapons and faith in victory to the east. Autumn fell, the rains began. เฮ เฮ เฮ เฮ shelter Did you tell me? Quietly, quietly, a little. Vitya, Vitya, help. Raskin, come to me, stay with him. Igor, I’m going to die. Yes, it hurts, it hurts. Very painfully. A ا Uh-huh. Hello, brothers and sisters. You are watching a new war documentary. 1941. Battle for Kiev. Yes, this is a documentary. There are feature films, there are documentaries. Do n’t confuse, brothers and sisters. This is a documentary. I am a Lithuanian director Angel Tadas. And I suggest you watch the film I created. Like it, write comments. Yes, there will be a blog with insulted comments because there is Lithuanian censorship. You know more about Russian censorship than you do. This is not Solovey. Solovey is Russian propagandist, and I am a free democratic country Lithuania. And I am a free democratic director Angel Tados. And I am sharing my opinion here. If you disagree with my opinion, write in the comments. Why is the documentary called 1941 and Zakev? Because the most important thing about World War II was in the German-Russian war. The German emperor fought against Stalin’s army. That’s all, period, because there was no other army. There was Stalin’s Red Army, yes, which collapsed in 1946. The Red Army did not remain. There was the Soviet Union Army, because the Red Army was defeated in World War II. We give you likes for this if you learned for the first time that the Red Army in 1946, no, everything collapsed and a new army of the Soviet Union was created, because Stalin lost World War II. Lost Germans, Stalin lost. England lost, France won World War II. America and the American dollar. Now everyone knows that America has a dollar that is recognized by the whole world and bitcoin, which is recognized by all people. This is a currency for people, not for the state. Don’t hide it, right? Cryptocurrency is for free people who don’t want to pay taxes. I explained everything. And the winners, as always, there is only America in the world. And America liberated all of Europe. We put a like, because America liberated all of Europe. Liberated Germany, liberated the Poles Vkhoslovakia and so on. Liberated everything, because Stalin’s communist empire collapsed. That’s it, there is no communist empire. The Red Terror was defeated and lost World War II. America won and liberated Lithuania too. Thank you, America, for liberating Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. And we became NATO Lithuanians, because America protects us. All the questions of America. Yes, that’s it. And we will not talk about this anymore. Today we are talking about World War II, about 1941. The battle for Kiev. Why is this battle for Kiev so important? The battle for Kiev is important because it is the fate of Germany. Yes. And Germany was defeated. If the generals in 1941 had told the German Emperor to either overthrow him or imprison him and take Moscow themselves, then Germany would have won. We give them a like. But that didn’t happen. They followed the leash, the defeat of the German Emperor. The German Emperor could not win World War II. The German generals could have won World War II. The German generals got the German Emperor, which everyone knows. They established a state of generals. The army captured, gave freedom to the free country and signed a peace. Don’t forget, the generals signed the peace of Sbery. Is that clear to you? Beria came to power because Beria was ready to imprison Stalin for the Stalinist regime, yes. And we will free the prisoners, yes. And send, yes, was ready to take liberate everything. And he did not need Beria anymore. Neither Lithuania, nor Estonia, nor Latvia, nor Belarus, nor Ukraine. Screw you. You can live without it, because there is Siberia, there is oil, there are other countries that will not be free, will belong to Beria’s empire. But the German generals did not do this, because Beria offered, there are secret signatures, where Beria said: “I can remove Stalin from power, we really sign with peace, I do not want to fight.” and all know. When the third world war came, Stalin was ready to fight with Europe, with America, but Beria then removed him from his post by Lithuanian gave the Lithuanian cognac of the crown to fall. Stalin drank the Lithuanian crown and fell asleep. He slept for two days, could not go anywhere. It was the heaviest crown called. Stalin drank the Lithuanian crown. So that’s it. And there was no third world war. And then, but Berje was also removed. So, he explained. Everything is clear. So, peace could have been, and Germany could have played for a draw. It could have played for a draw. Berje signed. peace, when everyone knows what Berje proposed, Berje could have, because in 1941 Stalin himself understood what he thought was behind him, that he came to arrest him. Berje could have put Stalin in jail in 1941, could have made it look like Stalin was guilty, could have poisoned him like the fifty-third, could have arrested him, could have killed him, because he had good power and Stalin was a disgrace, because there was Stalin’s empire, Stalin’s army, and the generals supported Stalin, because they understood that the war could not be won, but this did not happen, because many mistakes were made. And therefore the forty -first battle for Kiev is the biggest mistake. The center could have gone to Moscow, they made a small encirclement of Kiev. So what? What? What’s big? The most important thing is always to take Moscow. Screw this Peter. So, Napoleon knew that he had to take Moscow, but he didn’t have it like the Germans said: “We took Moscow and waited for Napoleon to wait for us.” So, that’s a joke. Holy shit, that’s how I explained it, right? And that’s the second most important mistake of the German emperor. And the generals are to blame, that if the generals removed, gave democrats, ska and put all the Gestafa in jail, because there’s no need to sink American ships, no need for genocides, there’s no genocide, we don’t sink ships and sign peace with England, with America everything was Germany. Great. Yes, but that didn’t happen, because the dictator was the German emperor, the dictator was steel, the dictator was Italian, Talia was also a dictator. So, let me explain. The most important thing was to decide where to go. There were negotiations, and the German emperor said: “No, we will not go to Moscow, we must circle.” Why didn’t you hit the flank? Hardly anyone will hit you when everyone is running away from Moscow. We all know how they ran away from Moscow until Stalin talked. Everyone knows where Stalin went. The Serb talked to God and that’s it. And then the Germans did not take Moscow, because you always have to answer for your mistakes. You have to answer for everything. There is no free work. You can’t get anything for free. Because you made a mistake. A person has free will. You can do this or that. If you did it wrong, that’s it, you made a mistake. All the people will answer for this mistake. Yes. Let’s put likes again. Don’t forget to put likes, brothers and sisters. Like, like, like. Comment, write your opinion. Here we came to say our opinion. I am right, I am wrong. Here we discuss. And then we will listen to what the German generals say about the German emperor. Why didn’t they revolt? Why didn’t they sign peace? Why did they see how many Russian tanks there were? They saw how the Russians fought, how many they lost, how many they captured, what were they thinking there, what did they know who Russia was, that Russia was not needed. In Russia, under Stalin’s regime, everyone worked for a piece of bread, for a piece of porridge, getting a sack and working all day and all night, because no one cares about you. People, people, are material for guns. And everyone was slaves. It was Stalin’s slavery. There was no speech and freedom. Who said steel? That’s it. And everyone must do as he said. Nothing is clear. Execution in gulak. Execution in gulak. We all listen. We obey. We listen to the poina. That’s it, if you’re late to the factory, it’s not your business, little tank. That’s it, you’re 5 minutes late. The police have arrived. It was not the police, it was the militia then. And they will put you in the gulak. Don’t want to work? Go to the gulak without the gulag. You will die in the gulag, because you are not a kid in the gulag. Don’t confuse things. In the gulag there are workers who die. There are guys who rob workers, they live well. There is the zone mafia. That’s it, corruption has always been at the very top. So there it was all mafia, mafia, mafia, corruption, mafia, corruption. If you are a worker, that’s it, you must have a good job in the gulag , a good welder, a good shoemaker or whatever, what will you do, earn money, how will you live there. If you cut down trees, you will not live there, you will die of hunger, because you will be robbed there, they robbed, robbed, robbed. Racketeering, racketeering, robbery, everything is mafia, everywhere is mafia. And so everyone knew that if you are a worker, you will die in a gulak. If you die or die in a factory, you have no choice to die in a factory, to die in a gulak. The guys don’t work. The guys don’t work in the factory. The guys worked as a foreman or a team leader in the zone. Do you know who a foreman is? The foreman runs everything. So, everything is under control there, all the money was coming, everything was going. Rekat, as if it was normal that you were brought, rekat. A guy came, that it is necessary to share, that it is not shared. That’s it, others will come. Others will come and kill at night. That’s it, the zone is a zone of Szonskaya understanding. Everyone knows. So, everything is clear. How did they transfer to that zone? But it was really no one. There were political prisoners who were late. They were all imprisoned for 10-15 years. Late. That’s it, sabotage. That’s it, go have a walk, because someone else will do the work for you. Everything worked so hard. We put likes, write comments. So why, why did the German emperor go to encircle the Ark? Where were the tanks going? The tanks were supposed to pour into Moscow without stopping. And then they took Moscow and went on, they took Vladivostok, because this is the power of fear, the power of panic, that’s all. And then they stopped the fear, stopped the panic, took new mobilized soldiers and went, you know where? To Berlin, because in 1943 everything fell into place, because fear ended, because there is repression and fear was defeated. So there was no profit, the Red Army, the red slaves, the mushy meat, whatever you want to call it, you received mobilization, that’s it, and you died. That’s it. If you know where to encircle, who to put a bottle, who a wreath, who something, you will go to cut down other trees, construction, there were not all the engineering battalions. Infantry, empty meat, there was artillery, aviation assistants, the airfields were far away, not all the Germans flew in. There were many survivors there. 12 million people were mobilized. And if you got into the infantry, then the cannon fodder went 2 minutes. No, you have to be a professional then. A professional, in short, you were or a lucky guy. Well, there were few of those and we all know. Yes, there were some who, but in 1941 there was no army, because everyone was captured, surrounded, and yes, those remained, the ships were in Siberia, yes, they were sitting there with the Japanese, they were sitting, waiting, waiting. So, I explained everything clearly. The most important thing was the 1941 battle for Kiev. If the Germans did not go to encircle a large piece of Kiev, they encircled a large piece of Moscow, there was also panic. Not all roads lead to Moscow. The Murmansk railway did not receive Lend-Lease either. And so on. And panic, panic, panic, panic. But it was necessary to sign a peace treaty, take Moscow and sign a peace treaty. That’s it, Moscow is ours, and you go on, we sign a peace treaty. That’s it, we put likes and then, well, let them make new tanks. That’s it, but we will give freedom. The collective farms will collapse. That’s it, we give factories, the entire economy will rise. Nobody wants to become a slave again. We put likes, write comments. All that. We discussed how it could have happened, but here we are looking at what happened. So, and what mistakes are we looking for here, what mistakes did the German emperor and the German general make. That’s it. And why aren’t we talking about genocide here and so clearly? All of them should be tried. And you know, the court decides, it’s not me who decides, I’m not a judge. We don’t talk about the Gestapo here. The Gestapo should be tried. Everyone was Gestapo, so the court judged them. That’s it, the Jews found everyone and put them in prison. That’s it, we put likes. Let’s look further at what the German generals say about this battle. The forty-first battle for Kiev. Either they had to go to Kiev, or they had to go to Moscow, because there were two: go to Moscow or to Kiev, and they went to Kiev. That’s it. And that’s why this documentary is called the forty-first battle for Kiev, because there was the most important decision, where to go, to Moscow or to Kiev. You have to know the truth, because we will only find out the truth after 80 years. Now we won’t find out, because we won’t talk about what’s going on there. The Russian Ukrainian war will also have its archives opened after 80 years, and our grandchildren will find out what happened there. Let’s put likes. That’s it, brothers, let’s watch and listen. You need to know the truth. Let’s put likes. That’s it, bye, brothers. Let’s watch on. Memories of the German General Heinz Guderin. Tank forces of Germany in World War II. In France, the Nineteenth Corps covered 149 miles from the sedan to the obvel in 7 days. The maximum daily march was 56 miles, and on the last day of the campaign. In Russia, the second tank group covered 273 miles from Brest, Litovsk to Babruysk in 7 days. The maximum daily march was 72 miles. And again on the last day. By July 16, the group found itself at the walls of Smolensk, having covered 413 miles, despite serious resistance from the Russians and technical stops . During this rapid advance, Army Group Center captured large trophies, including 2,500 tanks and 1,500 guns, with the lion’s share of tanks captured by tank groups. However, the infantry also showed amazing results, covering huge distances on foot, despite the dust and intense summer heat. The infantry units were constantly trying to catch up with the motorized columns. Their task was to eliminate significant enemy groups that had ended up in the German rear after the breakthrough of Guderian and Goth’s tanks. And again the minds of the high command were preoccupied with the dilemma of how to link the pace of the offensive with the pace of liquidation of the outflanked enemy, who had to be first blocked and then, by tightening the encirclement, forced to surrender or be destroyed. This dilemma was much more acute in Russia than in France. Guderin and God sought to advance regardless of how the situation was developing in their rear. They counted on ensuring security through movement and believed that the chaos and panic they sowed would more than compensate for any attempts by disparate enemy formations to conduct combat operations in the rear of the German troops. The brightly blazing torch of victory drew them forward and blinded them, preventing them from seeing what was happening behind them. However, reviving the precedent set in France, Hitler intervened this time too and demanded that Guderian and God close their armies at Minsk, not at Smolensk, as God had wished, although Guderian admitted that overcoming such a long distance in one go is fraught with considerable risk. The first mistake of the German Emperor was the siege of Minsk. In the end, they could have besieged larger objects. Smolensk and faster, because the speed of tanks is very important. Barbarossa’s plan works, but the German Emperor did not appreciate Stalin and began to make mistakes. After all, every mistake is a defeat for the Germans. Stalin and Beria offered the Germans to sign a treaty, and then the Germans would have been well fortified. They would have liberated the occupied countries from Stalin’s terror and Stalin’s gulag and created free and democratic countries, namely Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus. The whole world would have learned about Stalin’s terror, about the twenty thousand Polish officers shot by Beria, and they would have signed peace with America and England. But then the Third Reich would not have collapsed. The offensive was scheduled to begin on August 1 for the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps and the Seventh Army Corps , and on August 2 for the Ninth Army Corps. The remaining days were spent preparing for the offensive. Particular attention had to be paid to the army corps assigned to me, which had hardly ever had to take part in combat against the Russians and were unfamiliar with my methods of conducting offensive operations. These troops had not yet had to operate in close cooperation with tanks, so I doubted the success of their actions. Particular doubt is aroused by the recollections of the German General Heims Guderin. Tank forces of Germany in World War II. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continued in the Yelnya area, requiring a large expenditure of ammunition. Here our last reserve, a company guarding the command post of our tank group, was thrown into battle . By August 3, the group’s troops reached: the seventh infantry division and the third tank division in the area west of Klimovichi, the tenth motorized division – Khislavichi. The seventy-eighth infantry division – Ponyatovka. The twenty-third infantry division – Roslavl. The 197th infantry division and the fifth machine-gun battalion of Severne-Roslavl, the 263rd infantry division – southern Prutki, the 292nd infantry division – Cossacks, the 137th infantry division – the eastern bank of the Desna, the tenth tank division, the 286th infantry division – the Srykh infantry regiment – Great Germany – Yelnya, the seventeenth tank division – northern Yelnya, the twenty-ninth motorized division – south of Smolensk, the eighteenth tank division – Prutki. The headquarters of the Twentieth Army Corps has just arrived. On the morning of 4 August I was summoned to Army Group headquarters, where Hitler was to make his first report since the start of the campaign in Russia . We were on the eve of a decisive turning point in the war. Moscow or Kiev? The conference with Hitler’s participation took place in the town of Borisov, where the headquarters of Army Group Center was located. Hitler, Schmunt, Field Marshal von Bogue, Hoth and I were present, as well as the representative of the OK, the chief of the operations department, Colonel Hosinger. Each participant in the conference was given the opportunity to express his point of view in turn, in such a way that no one knew what the previous participant had said. All the generals of Army Group Center unanimously spoke out in favor of continuing the offensive on Moscow, which was of decisive importance. God declared that his tank group could begin the offensive no earlier than 20 August. I declared that I would be ready by 15 August. Then Hitler spoke in the presence of all the participants in the conference. He declared that his first target was the industrial region of Leningrad. The question of whether to then attack Moscow or Ukraine had not yet been finally decided. Hitler himself was inclined to begin with an attack on Ukraine, since Army Group South had also achieved certain successes at the present time. In addition, he believed that the raw materials and food resources of Ukraine were extremely necessary for the further conduct of the war, and that, finally, an attack on Ukraine would give him the opportunity to wrest Crimea from the hands of the Russians, which, in Hitler’s opinion, was an aircraft carrier for the Soviet Union, from where raids were being carried out on the oil fields of Romania. By the beginning of winter, he hoped to control Moscow and Kharkov. The final decision on this most important question for us about the further course of the war was not made that day. Memories of a German general. Tank forces of Germany in World War II 1939-1945. Then the meeting moved on to the analysis of individual issues. As for my tank group, for it The most important thing was to achieve a renunciation of the intention to withdraw our troops from the Yelnya salient, since this salient could later serve as a starting point for an offensive on Moscow. I emphasized the need to replace our engines, which wore out very quickly here due to the unprecedented dust. If only this year were to be the time for operations requiring tanks to cover long distances. We also needed to make up for our losses in tanks with new tanks. After some hesitation, Hitler promised to allocate 300 tank engines for the entire eastern front, a number that did not satisfy me at all. We were completely refused new tanks, since Hitler intended all new tanks for the new tank units being formed in Germany. When discussing this matter, I pointed out to Hitler the fact that the Russians had a great superiority in tanks, which would increase if our losses in tanks were the same. Hitler then blurted out: “If I had known that the Russians really had the number of tanks that you mentioned in your book, I probably would not have started this war.” In my book “Attention! Tanks”, published in 1937, I indicated that at that time there were 10,000 tanks in Russia. However, the Chief of the General Staff Beg and the censors objected to this figure. It took me a lot of effort to obtain permission to publish these figures, although in fact the information at my disposal indicated that the Russians had 17,000 tanks at that time, and I myself approached the publication of the information I had with extreme caution. In the face of impending danger, one cannot follow an ostrich policy. However, Hitler and his most authoritative political, economic and military advisers constantly followed this political line. This policy of forcibly closing one’s eyes to harsh reality led to catastrophic results, the consequences of which we are still having to endure today. Returning from the conference, I decided to begin preparations for an offensive on Moscow, just in case. At my command post, I learned that the 9th Army Corps, fearing a Russian breakthrough in the southeastern part of the pocket near Yermolino, had abandoned the Moscow Highway and that there was a danger of a breakthrough by Russian troops of the encirclement ring that had been closed on August 3. Early in the morning of August 5, I hurried to the area where the 7th Corps was located, so that from there I could go out onto the Moscow Highway and close the gap from the south again. Along the way, I encountered units of the 15th Infantry Division, which were heading for the Yelnya area. I briefly briefed the division commander on the situation in that area. Then I went to the 197th Infantry Division, where its commander, General Mayer Robingen, reported to me that a gap had formed in the Russian encirclement ring and that the Russians, in any case, were keeping the Moscow Highway under fire. On arrival at the 4th Panzer Division I learned that the tanks of the 35th Panzer Regiment had been pulled back. I immediately radioed orders to the Panzer Corps, making it responsible for holding the Moscow Highway, and I went to the 7th Army Corps. This corps had already sent a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division with the task of preventing the Russians from breaking out of the pocket. I considered the measures taken to be completely inadequate, and together with the chief of staff of the 7th Army Corps, Colonel Kreps, an old friend of mine from the time of our joint service in Gaslar, I went to Roslavl. In Roslavl I met the tank company of Oberleutnant Krause. The second company of the 35th Regiment, which was heading for rest. The commander of this company himself was still in the combat zone. The company held off the enemy’s attempts to break out of the encirclement until morning, destroyed many guns and captured a significant number of prisoners. Then the company was ordered to withdraw. I immediately turned the brave company back, ordering it to return and occupy its former position. Then I ordered the second battalion, 332nd Infantry Regiment, to begin advancing toward the bridge over the Ostrik River. Finally, I alerted the anti-aircraft artillery unit located near Roslavl, and then headed for the front line. Looking at the bridge over the Ostrik River, I noticed a group of Russians, about 100 strong, approaching the northern bridge. This group was scattered. The tanks crossed the bridge, which had been repaired in recent days, and prevented the Russians from breaking out of the encirclement. After the tanks had re-established contact with the 137th Infantry Division, I returned to the command post of the Seventh Army Corps, entrusting responsibility for holding the threatened sector in the area of the Moscow Highway to the commander of the artillery of the Seventh Corps, the capable and experienced Austrian General Martinique, and then returned by Storch plane to my command post. From there I transmitted the order to the Ninth Army Corps to establish contact with Martinique’s group. I gave my headquarters the task of preparing an offensive on Moscow in such a way that the tank corps would be able to operate on the right flank, advancing along the Moscow Highway, while the infantry corps would attack in the center and on the left flank. I intended to deliver the main blow with my right flank and, having broken through the rather weak Russian front in this area at that time, move along the Moscow Highway in the direction of Spas-Demensk and Vyazma, thereby facilitating the advance of Goth’s group, and then develop the offensive on Moscow. Carried away by these plans, I categorically refused to fulfill the OK demand I received on August 6, which was to send my tank divisions to attack Rogachev, located on the Dnieper, far behind the front line I occupied. My reconnaissance established that day that at a considerable distance around Roslavl there was almost no enemy in the direction of Bryansk and to the south the enemy was not detected at all for a distance of 40 km. These data were confirmed the following day. By August 8, it was already possible to sum up some of the results of the battles for Roslovl. Our troops captured a large number of prisoners, tanks and guns. These results were extremely encouraging and significant. Before going on the offensive on Moscow or undertaking any other operation, we had to first fulfill one more condition: to secure our right flank of Ukrichev, located in a deep ledge back. Clearing this flank of enemy troops was also necessary in order to facilitate the Second Army’s offensive on Rogachev. Both the command of Army Group Center and the command of the tank group believed that this would eliminate the need to send tank forces to the area of operations of the Second Army and the great wear and tear of equipment caused by long marches. The distance from Roslavl to Rogachev is 200 km, and there and back 400 km. Both headquarters believed that our main goal should be to develop the offensive on Moscow. However, despite this, repeated demands were still coming from Army Group Headquarters, apparently under pressure from the OK, to transfer some tank units in the direction of Propoisk Slavgorod. All misunderstandings connected with these demands were settled by the decision of General Giyer, who wanted to get rid of the constant pressure on his right flank by attacking the enemy south of Krichevo in the Miloslavich area. I agreed with this decision, having also received the approval of Army Group Headquarters, which abandoned its demand to send tanks in the direction of Propoisk, Slavgorod. On August 8, I went to the corps and divisions located in Vroslavl and to the south, and on August 9 I was present at the attack of the 24th Tank Corps, being together with the 4th Tank Division. The 35th Tank and 12th Motorized Rifle Regiments carried out the attack excellently and were properly supported by the artillery of Colonel Schneider. On August 10, for reasons unknown to me, an order was received to send the second tank division to France, which had previously been in OK reserve. The advance of the second army on Gomel had recently been delayed by the poor condition of the roads. By August 10, the group’s troops were located, the seventh infantry division in the area south of Khotovish. The third and fourth tank divisions were advancing south, west of Miloslavichi. The tenth motorized division – Miloslavichi. The seventy-eighth infantry division in Sloboda. Its advance detachment in Bukhan. The 197th infantry division in Ostrovaya. Its advance detachment is in Oleshnya. The 29th Motorized Division is in Roslavl. The 23rd Infantry Division is resting north of Roslavl. The 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions are on the Desna line. The 268th, 292nd and 15th Infantry Divisions are in the area of the Yelnya salient. The 10th Panzer Division is west of Yelnya. The 17th Panzer Division is northwest of Yelnya. The 18th Panzer Division is on the eastern edges. The division is in the northwest of Yelnya, where the Grossdeutschland Regiment was also resting and being refitted. Up to now, all the measures taken by my tank group have been based on our understanding that both the Army Group Command and the OK consider the offensive on Moscow to be the most decisive operation. I still hoped that , despite the results of the conference in Borisov on 4 August, Hitler would finally agree to what seemed to me the most reasonable plan. However, on 11 August I had to bury this hope. The OK rejected my plan to attack Moscow by delivering the main blow from Roslavl to Vyazma, considering this plan unacceptable. The OK did not draw up any other, better plan, and during the following days it displayed a series of endless vacillations, which made any long-term planning by lower staffs completely impossible. The army group command apparently resigned itself to the fact that my plan of attack had been rejected, although it had supported it on 4 August. Unfortunately, I did not know at the time that a few days later Hitler had agreed to the idea of ​​an attack on Moscow. Moreover, his agreement was dependent on the fulfillment of certain preliminary conditions. In any case, the OK was not able to take advantage of Hitler’s fleeting agreement at that time. A few days later, things turned out differently again. On August 13, I visited the Por, Desna, and Vostochne Roslavl front line, which ran along both sides of the Moscow Highway. With a heavy heart, I watched as the troops were fully confident that they would soon be advancing on the Russian capital. They had already prepared road abacuses and signs with inscriptions pointing to Moscow. The soldiers of the 137th Infantry Division, with whom I had to talk during my visit to the front line, talked only about resuming the offensive to the east in the near future. By August 14, the battles that the 24th Tank Corps had been fighting in the Krichev area had been successfully completed. Many artillery pieces and other trophies had been captured. Our troops captured Kostyukovich. After my proposal to advance on Moscow was rejected, I made a completely logical proposal to withdraw troops from the Yelnya salient, which was no longer needed by us, where we had suffered heavy losses all the time. However, the Army Group Command and the OK rejected my proposal, which was based on the need to save human lives. It was rejected under the absurd pretext that the enemy was in an even more difficult situation on this section of the front than we were. During the day of August 15, I had to expend a lot of effort to convince my superiors to abandon their intention to take advantage of the success of the 24th Panzer Corps to launch an offensive on Gomel. In my eyes, such a march of the corps in the direction of the south. West was tantamount to a retreat. The Army Group Command tried to take one tank division from the corps to achieve this goal , without taking into account, however, the fact that it was impossible to carry out such an operation with the forces of one division. It would have been necessary to commit the entire 24th Panzer Corps to the battle, and to secure its left flank with the forces of other formations. In addition, since June 22, 1941, the troops of the Twenty-fourth Tank Corps had not had a single day of rest and were in dire need of a break in combat operations to bring their equipment into working order. Not even half an hour had passed since I had managed to obtain the consent of the army group command to this. As a result, an order was received to send one tank division in the direction of Gomel. The Twenty-fourth Tank Corps was now ordered to advance south in the direction of Novozybkov and Starodub, with the third and fourth tank divisions in the first echelon, and the tenth motorized division in the second. And after a successful breakthrough, to turn the division that would operate on the right flank towards Gomel. On August 16, the third tank division captured the key point of the highways of the city of Glin. On this day, the Army Center group was ordered to transfer the Thirty-ninth Tank Corps consisting of the Twelfth Tank Division, the Eighteenth and Twentieth Motorized Divisions to the disposal of the Army Group North. I will not touch here on the hesitations on the part of the command of the Army Center group, which were shown in the following days during telephone negotiations. On August 17, the right flank of the Twenty-fourth Tank Corps fell far behind as a result of stubborn enemy resistance, while the Tenth Motorized Division and, above all, the Third Tank Division of the Corps, operating on the left flank, successfully advanced forward, capturing the junction station of U Necha. Thus, the Gomel-Bryansk railway line was cut, and our troops penetrated deeply into the enemy’s positions. How could the results of this breakthrough be better exploited? It was assumed that the Second Army, relying on my right flank, would advance on Gomel with its strong left flank. However, strangely enough, this did not happen. The main forces of the Second Army were advanced from its left flank to the north-east and moved far behind the offensive front of the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps, which at that time was engaged in heavy fighting in the Starodub-Unecha area. I turned to the headquarters of the army group with a request to give the order to the Second Army to move its formation first of all against the enemy operating on our right flank. I was promised that the headquarters would give such an order. However, when I asked the headquarters of the Second Army whether it had received such an order, I was informed that the offensive in the north-east direction had been undertaken by the Second Army on the orders of the headquarters of the army group. The expediency of carrying out decisive actions was also dictated by the fact that on August 17, information was received about the enemy’s withdrawal from the Gomel area. Already on this day, the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps received an order to block the enemy’s path to the east in the Unecha and Starodub areas. On August 19, the First Tank Group, part of Army Group South, captured a small bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper near the city of Zaporozhye. The Second Army captured Gomel. The Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps, part of my tank group, was ordered to break through Klintsy and Starodub to Novozybkov, and the Forty-Seventh Tank Corps was ordered to secure the left flank of the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps. The enemy offered stubborn resistance near Pochep. On August 18, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces presented Hitler with his considerations regarding the further development of military operations on the Eastern Front. On August 20, the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps repelled enemy attacks on the Surazh, Klintsy, Starodub line. A separate unit managed to break through to the east in the area south of Unecha. Attacks on Yelnya were repelled. On the same day, Field Marshal von Bogue ordered me by telephone to halt the further offensive on Pochep, which was being carried out by the left flank of the Second Panzer Group. He expressed the wish that all troops of the Panzer Group be concentrated for rest in the Roslavl area, so that they could undertake the offensive on Moscow he was planning with fresh forces. Bogue did not know for what reason the Second Army was not advancing. He was always in a hurry. On August 21, the Twenty- Fourth Panzer Corps captured Kostabobr. The Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps captured Pochep. On August 22, an order was given to transfer the Twentieth, Ninth, and Seventh Army Corps to the Fourth Army. The command post of the second tank group was moved to Shumyachi Zapadne Roslavl, so that it would be closer to the divisions at 1900. That same day, I received a request from the army group headquarters about whether I could transfer my tank units, ready for action in the Klintsy- Pochep area, to the left flank of the second army for an offensive in the southern direction in cooperation with the sixth army of the army group South. It turned out that an order had been received even earlier from the OK or OKW, which prescribed that one of the motorized divisions be allocated to participate in the offensive carried out by the second army. I informed the army group headquarters that I considered the use of a tank group for actions in this direction to be fundamentally wrong. Its fragmentation was a direct crime. On August 23, I was summoned to the headquarters of the Army Group Center for a meeting, which was attended by the chief of the general staff of the ground forces. troops. He informed us that Hitler had decided to attack first of all not on Leningrad or Moscow, but on the Ukraine and the Crimea. It was obvious to us that the Chief of the General Staff, General Colonel Halder, was himself deeply shocked by the fact that his plan for developing the offensive on Moscow had failed. We had a long meeting to discuss what could be done to make Hitler change his final decision. We were all deeply convinced that the offensive on Kiev planned by Hitler would inevitably lead to a winter campaign with all its difficulties, which the OK wanted to avoid, having every reason to do so. I drew the attention of the participants in the meeting to the poor condition of the roads and the supply difficulties that the tank troops would encounter during the offensive to the south, and expressed doubt as to whether the material part of the tank units would be able to withstand these new tests, and then the winter campaign. The offensive on Moscow. I then outlined to them the state of the 24th Panzer Corps, which had not had a single day of rest since the beginning of the campaign in Russia. All these arguments could be used by the Chief of the General Staff to try once again to influence Hitler to change his decision. Field Marshal von Bogue also understood me well and after some thought suggested that I go with Colonel General Halder to the Fuehrer’s headquarters and as a front general report directly to Hitler our views on the further development of operations. Fondbock’s proposal was accepted. We flew to headquarters and by evening landed at the Lecin airfield, Lugano, in East Prussia. I immediately went to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch greeted me with the following words: “I forbid you to raise the question of an attack on Moscow with the Führer. The order is to attack in the southern direction, and the only question that can be discussed is how to carry it out. Further discussion of the matter is useless. In response to this, I asked permission to fly back to my tank group, since under such conditions there was no point in entering into any explanations with Hitler. However, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch did not agree to this. He ordered me to go to Hitler and report to him the situation of my tank group, without, however, mentioning anything about Moscow. I went to Hitler and in the presence of a large circle of people, Keitel, Jodl, Schmunt and others, reported the situation at the front to my tank group, the situation of the group itself, and also the nature of the terrain. Unfortunately, neither Brauchitsch, nor Golder, nor any other representative of the OK were present at my report. After I had finished my report, Hitler asked me the following question: “Do you consider your troops capable of making another major effort with their present fighting capacity?” I answered: “If the troops have a real goal before them, which is clear to every soldier, then yes.” Hitler, you mean Moscow, of course. I answered: “Yes.” Since you have touched on this subject, allow me to state my views on this matter. Hitler gave his permission, and I laid out to him in detail and convincingly all the arguments in favor of continuing the offensive on Moscow and not on Kiev. I expressed my opinion that from a military point of view, things were now moving towards the complete destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, which had suffered significant losses in the recent battles. I outlined to him the geographical position of the capital of Russia, which differs significantly from other capitals, such as Paris, and is the center of communication and transport routes, the political and most important industrial center of the country. The capture of Moscow would greatly affect the morale of the Russian people, as well as the whole world. I drew his attention to the fact that the troops were determined to advance on Moscow and that all preparations in this direction were met with great enthusiasm. I tried to explain to Hitler that after achieving military success in the decisive direction and defeating the enemy’s main forces , it would be much easier to seize the economically important regions of the Ukraine, since the capture of Moscow, the hub of the most important roads, would make it extremely difficult for the Russians to transfer their troops from north to south. I also reminded him that the troops of the Armicenter group were already in full combat readiness to go on the offensive against Moscow, while the proposed offensive against Kiev is connected with the necessity of transferring troops to the southwest, which will take a lot of time. Moreover, in the subsequent offensive against Moscow, the tank troops will have to cover the same distance again , that is, from Roslavl to Lakhvitsa, equal to 450 km, which will cause repeated wear and tear of the equipment and fatigue of the personnel. Based on the experience of moving our troops in the direction of Unecha , I outlined to him the condition of the roads in the area indicated to me for the transfer of my troops, and drew his attention to the difficulties in organizing supplies, which will inevitably increase with each passing day if we are turned towards Ukraine. Finally, I pointed out the grave consequences that must arise if the operations in the south are delayed, especially due to bad weather. Then it will be too late to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy in the direction of Moscow this year. In conclusion, I asked Hitler to put all other considerations aside and subordinate them first and foremost to the solution of the main task, the achievement of a decisive military success. All other tasks would thereby be solved later. Hitler gave me the opportunity to speak without interrupting me even once. Then he took the floor to give us a detailed account of his reasons for coming to a different decision. He emphasized that the raw materials and food supplies of the Ukraine were vital for the continuation of the war. In this regard, he mentioned the need to seize Crimea, which was the Soviet Union’s aircraft carrier in its fight against Romanian oil. For the first time, I heard him say, “My generals understand nothing about military economics.” Hitler ended his speech with a strict order to immediately launch an offensive on Kiev, which was his immediate strategic target. At the same time, for the first time, I had to experience something that I was to encounter quite often later. After each of Hitler’s phrases, everyone present silently nodded their heads in agreement with him, but I remained with my opinion, alone. Obviously, he had already made such speeches more than once to justify his more than strange decisions. I was very sorry that during this report, on which a great deal depended, perhaps even the outcome of the war, neither Field Marshal von Brauchitsch nor Colonel General Halder were present. In view of the fact that the entire OKW was united against me, I decided to stop further fighting that day, because at that time I still believed that I would be able to achieve a face-to-face meeting with the head of state and prove to him the correctness of my views. After the decision to go over to the offensive in the Ukraine was once again confirmed, I had no choice but to carry it out in the best possible way. Therefore, I turned to Hitler with a request to abandon the previously planned splitting of my tank group and to order that the entire group be sent to carry out the new task in order to achieve rapid success before the onset of autumn, since the autumn rains make this roadless side impassable , and the movement of tank formations will be paralyzed. I had been promised that my request would be granted. It was well past midnight when I returned to my quarters. That same day, August 23, the OK had given Army Group Center the order to destroy the large forces of the Russian Fifth Army and to assist Army Group South in its speedy crossing of the Dnieper. To do this, it was necessary to create a strike group, if possible under the command of Colonel General Gudiryan, which was to strike with its right flank in the direction of Chernigov. I knew nothing of this order on the day I reported to Hitler. Colonel General Halder also did nothing to inform me of this order during the battle for Kiev. Hitler’s order of August 21, which served as the starting point for the forthcoming operations. Basically it said: “The OC proposal of August 18 to develop the operation in the direction of Moscow does not correspond to my plans. I order one. The most important goal before the onset of winter is not to consider the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, the industrial and coal region of Donbass and depriving the Russians of access to Caucasian oil. In the north, the most important goal is to consider the blockade of Leningrad and a connection with the Finns. Two. The exceptionally favorable operational situation that has arisen thanks to our reaching the Gomel-Pochep line must be used to immediately undertake an operation that must be carried out by the adjacent flanks of Army Groups South and Center. The objective of this operation must not be simply to drive the Russian Fifth Army beyond the Dnieper line using only the forces of our Sixth Army, but to completely destroy the enemy before he reaches the Desna Kanatopr. Suda line. This will enable Army Group South to occupy a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the area of the middle reaches, and with its left flank, in cooperation with Army Group Center, to develop an offensive on Rostov-Kharkov. Three. Army Group Center must, without regard to further plans, allocate for the implementation of the said operation as many forces as are required to destroy the Russian Fifth Army, leaving itself the small forces necessary to repel enemy attacks on the central sector of the front. Four. To seize the Crimean Peninsula, which is of primary importance for the unhindered export of oil from Romania. In Memory of a German General. German Tank Troops in World War II. 1939-1945 This order, the exact text of which I did not yet know at the time of my report on 23 August, served as the basis for the instructions given to my tank group by the OK and the command of Army Group Centre. My most bitter disappointment was the withdrawal of the 46th Tank Corps from my tank group. Despite the promise given to me by Hitler, the command of the army group decided to leave this corps in the reserve of the Fourth Army. Having concentrated it in the area of Roslavl and Smolensk, I had to set out on a new campaign with only two corps, the 24th and 47th, whose strength I had recognized as insufficient from the very beginning. My protest against this decision was ignored by the command of the army group. Kanotop was not indicated as the initial objective of the offensive. All other instructions regarding the establishment of interaction with the South Caucasus group remained in force. Given the grouping of forces of my tank group at that time, I had no choice but to set the task for the 24th Tank Corps, which was already in the Unecha area, to break through the Russian front again and at the same time protect our right flank from the threat of the enemy retreating from the Gomel area to the east. The 47th Tank Corps was given the task of using the forces of the 17th Tank Division, the only division that the corps had the ability to immediately commit to battle. To protect the left flank of the tank group by going on the offensive against large Russian forces located along the eastern bank. Sudost south of Pochep. Samara. Sudost in the dry season did not present any serious obstacle. The 29th Motorized Division already at that time occupied the Desna and the upper reaches of the OR. Sudost defense stretching 80 km. East of Starodub the enemy was still located along the western bank of the Sudost on the flank of the 24th Tank Corps. After the 29th Motorized Division was replaced by an infantry division, the length of our flank from Pochep to the original offensive target of Konotop was 180 km. Only from here did the main operation begin, and, consequently, the main threat. Information about the enemy forces on the left flank was extremely fragmentary. In any case, it had to be taken into account that the forces of the 47th Tank Corps would be fully occupied with the task of securing our flank. The combat capability of the 24th Tank Corps, intended to act as a strike force, was significantly weakened by the fact that it had to begin performing a new task without having had time to rest and replenish after participating in extremely difficult battles and completing a tiring march. The position of the tank group on August 25 was as follows. The Twenty-fourth Tank Corps, the Tenth Motorized Division, passed through the hills and Avdeevka, the Third Tank Division, through Kostobobr and Novgorod Seversky. The Fourth Tank Division was tasked with clearing the Western Bank of the enemy. Sudost and, replaced by units of the forty-seventh tank corps, to move behind the third tank division. Forty-seventh tank corps. The seventeenth tank division received the task of crossing the left bank of the river Sudost at Pochep and advancing in the direction of Trupchevsk, after which it would cross to the left bank of the Desna and advance along the river Nayuga. West with the task of assisting the twenty-fourth tank corps in crossing the river Desna. All other forces of the corps had only just set out from the Roslavl area that day. Early in the morning of August 25, I went to the seventeenth tank division to be present at the crossing of the river Sudost Ir, a river flowing to the south. The troops moved along bad sandy roads, experiencing significant difficulties. Many vehicles were out of order. Already at 1200 30 minutes I had to request reinforcements of command tanks, cars and motorcycles from Mglin . This promised us far from joyful prospects for the future. At 14:30 I arrived at the command post of the 17th Panzer Division, located 5 kilometers north of Pochep. In my opinion, the forces allocated for this difficult offensive were insufficient due to their small numbers. Therefore, compared to the 24th Panzer Corps, the 17th Panzer Division was advancing too slowly. I pointed this out to the division commander, General Von Tom, and to the corps commander who had arrived here. In order to familiarize myself with the enemy’s situation, I went to the 63rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which was advancing in the first echelon, and advanced with it for some time. I spent the night in Pochep. On the morning of August 26th, I went with my adjutant, Major Büsing, to the forward artillery observation post on the northern bank of the Rock to observe the results of our dive-bomber raids on the Russian defensive positions on the opposite bank of the river. The bombs fell accurately, but the damage was minimal. However, the moral effect of the bombing on the Russians, as a result of which they were driven into their trenches, enabled us to force the river almost without losses. Due to the careless behavior of one of our officers, the Russian observers noticed us and opened accurate mortar fire. A mine exploded in the immediate vicinity of our observation post, wounding five officers, including Major Büsing, who was sitting next to me. It was only by a miracle that I escaped unharmed. The Russian 269th and 282nd divisions were defending us . After the crossing of the horn and the building of the bridge had been completed in my presence, I set off in the afternoon via Mglin to Unecha, where the command post of the tank group had been transferred. On the way I received a joyful and completely unexpected report that the energetic actions of the tank unit of Oberleutnant Bokhterkh, the Sixth Tank Regiment, had enabled the Third Tank Division to capture the intact 700- meter-long bridge of the Desna-Vostochnya Novgorod Seversky people. This fortunate event greatly facilitated the conduct of our operations at that time. It was not until midnight that I reached my new command post. Here I found First General Paulus, who had arrived from the Okberquartiermeister, and several officers from the operations department of the OK General Staff, who had arrived at the command post during the day to familiarize themselves with the situation. Paulus had no authority to give orders. During my absence, Paulus discussed the situation with Lieutenant Colonel Baron von Loebenstein, and then contacted the OK and made a proposal to unite under a single command the left flank corps of the Second Army, the tank group and the first cavalry division operating on the left flank of this group. Paulus was given a mysterious answer that there could be no talk of re-subordinating the units of the Second Army at the present time, and that the movement of the Second Army was only of tactical importance. The first cavalry division remained with the Second Army, which transferred its main attack to the right flank. However, the enemy located on the Desna was too strong and could not simply be left in the depths of our left flank, as the OK apparently intended. It was necessary to first defeat this enemy in order to be able to advance further south. The next day I spoke with Paulus again, expressing all my thoughts to him. Paulus accurately conveyed them to the Chief of the General Staff, but given the hostility towards me that prevailed there, they made no impression. By the evening of August 26, the left flank of the Second Army was south of Novozybkoye. The dividing line between the tank group and the left flank of the Second Army ran from Klintsy through the hills to Sosnitsa in the north, east of Makoshin on the Desna. The dividing line with the Fourth Army ran from Surazh through Unecha, Pochep, Brasova. The Tenth Motorized Division of the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps was in the area of Kholmy, Avdeyevka. The Third Tank Division was concentrated at the bridge over the Desna, south of Novgorod Seversky. The Fourth Tank Division fought the enemy south of East Starodub. The 17th Tank Division of the 47th Tank Corps fought in the Semtsy area, south of Pochep. The 29th Motorized Division provided the left flank of the tank group in the Pochep-Zhukovka sector. After the infantry divisions of the 12th and 53rd Army Corps arrived, the 29th Motorized Division concentrated its forces on the right flank. The 18th Tank Division moved its forward units from the north through Roslavl. Simultaneously with the movement of the tank group from north to south, other formations were advancing from west to east. The 167th Infantry Division moved through Mglin. The 31st Infantry Division Severneya Mglin. The 34th Infantry Division through Kletnya, the 52nd Infantry Division through the stiles. The 267th and 252nd Infantry Divisions moved along the Krichev, Cherikov, Propoisk, Slavgorod road. All these divisions were part of the Second Army. If at least one part of these divisions had been turned south at the very beginning of the offensive on Kiev, the repeated crises on the right flank of the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps could have been avoided . On August 26, the resistance of the enemy, who was operating on the Desna people in front of the Second Army, increased . In order to achieve rapid success, I asked for the Forty-Seventh Tank Corps to be transferred to this sector. However, my request was rejected around August 9. On August 9, large enemy forces, supported by aviation, launched an offensive against the Twenty-Fourth Tank Corps from the south and west. The corps was forced to halt the offensive of the Third Tank Division and the Tenth Motorized Division. The Fourth Tank Division, having completed its task of clearing the western bank of the enemy, was pulled up to the Third Tank Division in the Novgorod-Seversky region. After personally reviewing the situation in front of the 24th Panzer Corps and the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, I decided to assign the 24th Panzer Corps the task of eliminating the threat to our flank on the right on 30 August and continuing the offensive in the southwest direction on 31 August. The 47th Panzer Corps was to advance along the eastern bank of the Sudost River and then continue the offensive in the Doller Desna towards Novgorod Seversky. At 1800 I flew back to my command post. On this trip I was accompanied for the last time by the chief of the operations department of the tank group, Lieutenant Colonel Berlein. He was transferred to Africa and Major Wolf was appointed in his place. By 31 August the Nar Desna bridgehead had been significantly expanded. The 4th Panzer Division crossed the Desna. The Tenth Motorized Division reached the Severneya Korob point, but as a result of a swift counterattack by the Russians it was thrown back to the opposite bank. Large enemy forces were also advancing on its right flank. By introducing into the battle the last forces, personnel of the bakery company, it was possible with great difficulty to avoid a catastrophe on the right flank. In the zone of operations of the Forty-Seventh Tank Corps, the Russians were advancing from the Trupchevsk region to the west and north. West with the forces of the 108th Tank Brigade, and beginning on September 1 also with the forces of the 110th Tank Brigade. Having strongly pressed back the staunchly holding unit of the Seventeenth Tank Division, the Twenty-ninth Motorized Division crossed the bridge at Novgorod- Seversky, and then advanced north to secure the northern flank of the bridgehead created by the Twenty-fourth Tank Corps, as well as to facilitate the advance of the Seventeenth Tank Division. The 18th Panzer Division replaced the 4th Panzer Division in the south-east In the area between the confluence of the Sudost River and the Desna River and Pochep, given the enemy’s offensive against both of my flanks and his active actions in front of the front, especially against the 10th Motorized Division, it seemed doubtful to me that I could continue the offensive with the forces available. I therefore again turned to the command of Army Group Center with a request to place the 46th Panzer Corps at my disposal. On August 30, only the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment, on September 1, the 1st Cavalry Division, and on September 2, the Sosreich Division from the Smolensk area were sent to my disposal. The 10-km-deep breakthrough by the Russians in the area of the 23rd Infantry Division south of Yelnya necessitated the use of the 10th Panzer Division to carry out a frontal counterattack here. The Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment was sent to the Novgorod- Seversky area. The Ssreich Division was moved forward to the right flank of the 24th Panzer Corps. On September 2nd the Grossdeutschland Regiment arrived in the area of the bridgehead at Novgorod-Seversky. The Ssreich Division arrived on the right flank of the 24th Panzer Corps on September 3rd. The fact that the necessary forces were only being made available to me little by little forced me on September 1st to send a radiogram to the Army Group Command in which I asked that the entire 46th Panzer Corps be placed at my disposal and, in addition, that the 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions and the 14th Motorized Division, which, as I knew, were not taking part in the fighting at that time, be transferred to me. I expressed the opinion that only with such large forces would it be possible to quickly complete the operation to capture Kiev. The immediate result of this radiogram was that the Ssreich Division was placed at my disposal. However, the contents of my radiogram were overheard by the OK control post and then became known in high circles. This was evidenced by the behavior of the OK liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Nagel. The contents of my radiogram were reported to Hitler, and the OKW carried out a number of measures on this occasion that were quite unfortunate for me. All of this will be described below. On September 2, the commander of the air force, Field Marshal Kasellering, came to the headquarters of the tank group for negotiations. He informed us that Army Group South had allegedly advanced and had captured some bridgeheads on the Dnieper. As for the direction of further development of the operation, there was still uncertainty about whether to advance on Kharkov or Kiev. On this day, Generals Model and von Thoma were slightly wounded. On September 3, I rode past the rear units of the 10th Motorized Division and the bakery company that had participated in the battle to the motorcycle units of the SRH Division, which were in the Avdeevka area. West of this settlement was the enemy, against whom the reconnaissance battalion of the SS Division was advancing. At first there was disorder on this section of the front, which, however, was quickly eliminated thanks to the clear leadership of General Gaser. I met him in Avdeevka and gave him the task of being ready to begin an offensive on Sosnitsa on September 4. I transferred the fifth machine-gun battalion, which had recently arrived from Roslavl, to his command. During the day I visited the tenth motorized division, which had had to take part in heavy fighting in recent days and which had suffered heavy losses. After the fourth tank division crossed to the southern bank of the Desna, the situation of the tenth motorized division improved somewhat. The Russians were especially active against the units preparing to cross the Desna. The tenth tank brigade of the Russians and the 29324th, 143rd and 42nd infantry divisions, which had a large numerical superiority, were operating against the tenth motorized division. I briefed the division commander, General Leper, on the situation and the mission of the neighboring SSRYH division, setting him the task of securing the SS division’s operations with his right flank the following day. I then headed to the area of the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Desna, held by the second battalion of the twentieth infantry regiment, whose personnel had made a good impression on me. Finally, I also visited the first battalion of the same regiment, which had suffered a setback a few days earlier, but had managed to quickly correct its mistake. This battalion had also made an excellent impression on me, and I expressed my confidence that it would also do an excellent job in the future. will carry out the tasks assigned to it. From my headquarters I received a message by radio that the 1st Cavalry Division had again been transferred to my command and was approaching the right flank of the SRx Division. Then I went again to the SS Division commander, ordering him to use his units to organize the supply of the 10th Motorized Division, after which I returned to my command post. There I learned that Borzno and Konotop, located in the direction of our attack, remained the immediate target of the offensive. The headquarters and half of the units of the 46th Panzer Corps were again transferred to the command of the tank group. Both corps reported that each of them had captured 2,500 prisoners. The unit of General of the Engineer Troops Bacher, created to guard the rear, captured 1,200 prisoners. The 24th Panzer Corps persistently drew attention to the ever-increasing threat to our southern flank, which was becoming longer and longer, and to the ever-increasing weakening of the tip of our wedge. Our troops captured the city of Krolevets. That day, the liaison officer of the High Command of the Ground Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Nagel, took part in a conference held at the headquarters of the Army Group in Borisov, which was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Nagel reported my assessment of the situation. For this, he was called a loudspeaker and propagandist and was immediately removed from his post. I was very sorry that this capable officer, who also knew Russian very well, was punished for the fact that, while fulfilling his official duty, he accurately reported to the command the views that prevailed at the front. This was not the end of the trouble. In the evening, heavy rain poured down, which soon made the roads impassable. 2/3 of the Sreich division units, which were on the march, got stuck on the way. On September 4, I spent the 4th Panzer Division at the front, where I met General Vongier. I spent 4 hours on the 75 km return journey, the roads were so badly damaged by the short-term rain. The fourth tank division intended to advance in the direction of the Krasnopolye box. The enemy operating against this division had so far defended itself very stubbornly, including against our tanks. However, as a result of the actions of dive bombers, the enemy’s resistance was mostly broken. General von Geyer, having studied the captured documents, determined that the greatest success could be achieved if the offensive continued in the direction of Sosnitsa. Since the junction between the thirteenth and twenty-first armies of the Russians was located here, it was entirely possible that the Russians had a gap in this section of the front. The third tank division reported its successful advance. I went to this division and met its units, which were advancing through Mutina and Spas Kekr. Sem. General Model also had the impression that he was facing very weak enemy defenses, or even some. That was a gap in his defense. I ordered Model to advance in the direction of the Kanotop-Belopolye railway line after crossing it and cut it. On the way back I radioed my headquarters about the next day’s actions. I had a presentiment that Hitler might interfere with the combat operations of the tank group. A telephone message received from Army Group Headquarters reported that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was dissatisfied with the actions of the tank group, especially the actions of the 47th Panzer Corps on the east bank of the Desna. I was asked to present my assessment of the situation and plans for the future. During the night an order arrived from the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces to stop the offensive of the 47th Panzer Corps and transfer the corps to the west bank of the river. The order was conveyed to me in a very harsh form, which hurt me greatly. This order had a stunning effect on the 47th Panzer Corps . The corps and division headquarters were confident of the success of the upcoming operation. The withdrawal of the corps and its waters back into battle on the opposite bank of the Desna required more time than the implementation of the previously planned offensive. Memories of a German general. Tank troops of Germany in the Second World War 1939-195 September the first cavalry division was transferred to the Pogar and transferred to the Fourth Army. We preferred to keep it as a mobile reserve on our left flank to secure the flank of the forty-seventh tank corps. Now Its maneuvering capabilities were not used due to the fact that the division received a permanent task of securing the flank in the Sudost sector. On this day, the SSRKh division was in control of Sosnitsa. The Fourth Army was ordered to abandon the Yelnya salient, since it had suffered heavy losses there, which I wanted to avoid in August by withdrawing in a timely manner. On September 6, I again visited the division with Sreich. On this day, the division was advancing on the railway bridge across the Desna at Makoshin. I ordered that the division be given the necessary air support. Due to the poor condition of the roads, the division was not yet fully assembled. Along the way, I met some units of the division that were on the march. Other units were resting in the forest. The personnel of the division made an excellent impression with their discipline and expressed their joy that the division would again be operating as part of a tank group. In the afternoon, the bridge was captured, and we thus secured another crossing of the Desna. I and the vehicles accompanying me had to move under enemy artillery fire several times, but we did not suffer any losses. On the way back I encountered units of the first cavalry division, which were on foot due to the poor condition of the roads, and a unit of the SSS division. Arriving at the division command post , I ordered the bridgehead to be expanded near Desne to prepare for the offensive.