Ukraine in 2024: In Search of the Best U.S. Policy

The Israel-Hamas war may have pushed Ukraine off the front pages, but Russia’s war against Kyiv is almost certain to remain a key focus of U.S. foreign policy throughout 2024. Tough choices await. Hopes that the combination of a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive, tough sanctions, and diplomatic pressure might force Putin to alter his strategic calculus have given way to a more realistic assessment that this conflict might last for many years.

What should we expect on the battlefield in 2024? Are there any realistic prospects for negotiations and should President Joe Biden’s administration be pushing for them? What are the impacts of delays in aid to Ukraine now and in the months ahead? Over the longer term, is containment the right strategy for dealing with a belligerent Russia?

Join Aaron David Miller as he sits down in conversation with Carnegie’s own Dara Massicot and Eric Ciaramella to discuss these and other issues.

Good morning good afternoon good evening wherever you are in this world of our I’m looking outside of my window now and it’s a snowy World um I’m wishing everyone a happy and healthy New Year um I’m Aaron David Miller a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and welcome to

Carnegie connects a series of conversations on issues of critical importance to America and to the world uh today we’re going to unpack and explore Russia’s war against Ukraine um and what may constitute the best approach for the Biden Administration in 20 24 uh and perhaps Beyond I can think

Of uh not two more distinguished and extraordinary analysts and Scholars on these matters to help guide us through this conversation so let me introduce them there Carnegie’s own Eric chamela and Dara masso um Dar is a senior fellow in the Russian Eurasia program at Carnegie her work focuses on defense and security

Issues in Russia and Eurasia prior to joining Carnegie uh darl was a senior policy researcher at Rand senior analyst for Russian military capabilities at the Department of Defense she’s published extensively on Russian military capabilities modernization efforts and strategy and a and a preeminent expert on the Russo

Ukrainian War shows a master’s degree in National Security and strategic studies from the US Naval War college and a ba in Russian language and literature and peace warn defense from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Eric chera is a senior fellow in the Russian Eurasia program at Carnegie where his

Work focuses on Ukraine and Russia prior to joining Carnegie uh Eric served for 12 years in the US government as an intelligence analyst and policy official he was a deputy National Intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia in National Intelligence Council where he helped lead the intelligence Community strategic analysis on the former Soviet

Union he also served on the NC Staff first as director for Ukraine and then as acting senior director for Europe and Russia he’s also been a um senior political analyst at CIA where he specialized in Europe and the former Soviet Union let me just make an opening

Comment before we get to our two guests you know as we begin the third year of this War uh soon it seems clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine is in a position at least now to achieve all of its objectives either on the battlefield or certainly through a negotiation how we describe this

Conflict is important I don’t think it’s a frozen conflict but is it a stalemate or or a grinding War of Attrition one thing it seems elementally clear um since 1815 the average length of an interstate conflict is three months according to the academic studies when a conflict lasts longer than a year

Or two it may stretch on to a decade so what we’re faced with under any conceivable circumstance is a relatively long War and if in fact that is the case excuse me how we approach this how we analyze this war um is critically important uh as Dar and Eric know uh our

Inestimable colleagues Andrew Weiss and Eugene Rumer in what I think is a mustre article in the Wall Street Journal argued that it’s time to end what they call the magical thinking when it comes to a short war or a decisive one the bottom line theirs is is that Putin

Feels no pressure to end the war and a great many reasons to maintain it perhaps indefinitely we’re going to talk about Russia and get Eric and der’s um analysis on what Putin is thinking but first I want to turn to the battlefield Dynamic let me start with you um Dar I

Was gonna quote from a long and depressing piece that Thomas gibons nef former Marine in Afghanistan now working for the New York Times who’s in in eastern Ukraine Now talks about Ukraine’s perilous position on the battlefield but Daren provide some P perspective if you will on first how

Would you describe this conflict and then uh give us some perspective on the battlefield Dynamic at the moment sure so I I don’t have a bumper sticker word yet for this but I don’t think stalemate is the right word stalemate would imply that neither side has a really good option moving forward

And that’s not true either this is still um very much hotly contested along most parts of the front Russia has been on the initiative now since the late fall since the Ukrainian counter offensive culminated um both sides are encountering the same type of problems when they try to move forward

Offensively it’s it’s a environment of constant surveillance with drones loitering Munitions and both sides are having problems massing the type of force necessary to to move forward um both sides are also operating pretty efficient on the defense too so this is um it’s not a stalemate stalemate implies it’s calcifying in place it’s

Not quite there yet um in terms of you know there are there are pieces that are pretty gloomy um that are out there I would say that things are not quite that bad um you know but there are some decisions that need to be made pretty urgently in terms of continuing to

Support military assistance to Ukraine and we can talk about that later um so uh clearly not a frozen conflict and you don’t I mean I appreciate you don’t want to use the bumper sticker word um it’s not a a stalemate um a grinding War of Attrition I only ask this question

Because attrition suggests that the larger power with the uh sizable population and Russia’s is three times Ukraine’s a greater industrial base um is has the advantage uh can you describe this as a grinding War of Attrition or is is that simply too simple uh you can and you we should talk

About what that looks like here because we can’t deny that Russia does have um a growing advantage that it can bring and is bringing in terms of Manpower and the rates of fire um since they’ve been mobilized for the last 15 months I mean that’s that’s happening the dynamic that

We see right now is not a stable one and over time if we don’t change this dynamic is going to get worse for Ukraine um Russia you know they they are able to stabilize their front lines with Manpower but this isn’t easy for them either they’re straining the volunteer

System to its limits they’re facing labor shortages in cre in critical Industries across Russia that aren’t directly affiliated with the defense industry and even a little bit there too so it is attrition Russia is willing to absorb a lot of casualties that frankly Ukraine cannot afford to um but their

Power remains pretty disordered if you look at all the advantages that they do have um whether it’s artillery rate of fire whether it’s Glide bombs whether it’s missile strikes on Ukraine they are still not able to translate that into meaningful forward progress which they would very much like to do right I’m

Gonna come back to this whole issue of the will to fight as opposed as opposed to the will to fund which is I think extremely important but Eric over to you um how do you see things uh hi Aon um I basically you know agree with with Dara’s analysis here that you know

Stalemate is probably not the right word to use here because you know if we think of it in kind of traditional chess terms it implies that there’s no move that any side can make to you know change the picture on the board and what’s actually happening here is that you have um a

Race to rearm really and that’s what 2024 is about um you know if in chess as you get to the endgame you could start throwing more Queens onto the board um that obviously is not a stalemate and eventually one side could throw more Queens onto the board and overpower and

Capture the king and so in this case you know what we’re talking about here is a Russian military reconstitution that’s underway and uh when you get to the the will to fund and this kind of um War of Attrition against a larger power the question is can Ukraine rely on the

Collective economic weight of his Western backers which far um dwarfs the economic potential of Russia so that’s where you get the kind of dynamic that you know this is this is static on the front lines right now hotly contested but mostly static by the end of this

Year things could be in a very different position based on the decisions that we and the Russians and Ukrainian leadership make now um almost two years into this war have um what have the Russians and ukrainians learned in terms of their capacity to adjust and to make their military campaigns more effective Dara

Thoughts yeah I I would say just watching the two of these um it’s been my impression that often the ukrainians are the first ones to try something Innovative and adaptive and the Russians often look at that and think that’s a really good idea and then they’re able

To take it and then they have the advantage of scaling it up at home and then putting it back into the Battlefield we’re seeing that now with drones we’re seeing that now with lering Munitions we’re seeing it um same Dynamic um in terms of inserting infantry really quickly um using an

Armored vehicle and then pulling back because they can’t actually bring large armor to the front all of those things were done those were techniques that were first um initiated by the ukrainians in this war and the Russians are able to to do it um they do have their own adaptations that they’re doing

They’ve they’ve been um you know innovating and adapting that process has really accelerated since they mobilized last September it gave them the financial bandwidth and access to State resources to do this and they’ve they’ve been learning the whole time and scaling it up um a lot of the innovations that I

See right now are uh with their Shahed drones how they’re using them how they fly um they’re trying to adapt their missile strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and Destroy them um so that it opens the skies up so you know the the ukrainians and Russians the cycle of

Learning adaptation is getting shorter and shorter and shorter all the time which you would expect for this point in a protracted War um against um two militaries like this um but it’s uh you know I think unfortunately the West has not fully activated a lot of its potential in technology and Innovation

And human capital because they haven’t made the same type of mobilization choices or activated the same types of legislations that would really crank this into overdrive in the way that the Russians have Eric can you I mean I know you’re interested in this piece of it

The will the will of fund can you um sort of walk we’ll save the US U um for a few minutes from now but on the European side I know the Brits have just um uh secured a significant package multier assistance but what what is

Driving the will to fund on the part of the Europeans after all one would think um that particularly on view of some of the Frontline states that um Russian military poses a much more threat to them than it does to us so what what’s driving um the European um piece of this

Sure so definitely on the European side you know there is a broad sense of urgency um and you know the sense that Russia can’t be allowed to Prevail in Ukraine because it would have devastating effects on the whole European security order um you know again even though Ukraine is not in NATO

Or the European union now um Ukraine’s kind of future security and prosperity and Independence European nations recognize um is now closely intertwined with their Fates as well and so there is you know it’s not necessarily an existential risk as it is for Ukraine you know the existence very existence of

Its state but it’s pretty close to that uh and so for the Europeans you’re you’re seeing I think a much more serious discussion about how to lock this policy in um on a more predictable and sustainable footing and there’s been some challenges associated with getting a new funding package approved with

Hungary’s um you know blockade and veto of the funding but there’s an effort to either work around the hungarians or find some sort of compromise with them about you know regular reviews or whatnot I saw um just before we signed on here that Hungarian prime minister Orban had just met with his Slovak

Counterpart Robert fito um who’s seen as the other kind of leading Ukraine skeptic although Slovakia under fito hasn’t really been willing to play the hard ball tactics that Hungary has but actually orban’s comments I read them as a little bit of an olive branch of saying you know basically we want to

Support Ukraine we think it’s in our interest we just need to do this in a way that doesn’t take away from you know the funding that’s given to um poor members of the EU that was the deal when we kind of entered the EU that um you

Know there would be this kind of redistribution of European wealth and so the net beneficiaries of European kind of budgetary payments um don’t want to give up that Advantage uh and so I think there’s a way forward on the European side frankly um it’s really and I know

We’re going to talk about the us later it’s it’s our Congress that I think is the trickier piece right and uh Ukraine frankly the the most consequential piece of the Ukraine story May well be not in European capitals or on the battlefield in the next six to eight months perhaps

In November as well but in Washington which is a perilous thought frankly um uh I want to ask you um if you would both comment on a a criticism and a charge that we frequently hear um Eric you and I talked about this before the charg made that the US was

Late in terms of the will to fund uh charges made that the US was late it was risk averse it didn’t demonstrate the excuse me the kind of risk Readiness that was critically important to provide Ukraine with the weapon systems in as timely a manner as

Was necessary and this was part of the reason uh that the Ukrainian counter offensive did not succeed it’s tough It’s counterfactual right I mean it’s hard to know U what would have been the case had had the Biden Administration sensitive to the risk of of escalation with which increasingly many

People began not to take seriously uh as the war dragged down but I just wanted to get your sense from both of you uh Dara first um is there any validity to this I think we have to distinguish um between what was a delay caused by risk

Aversion versus what was a delay caused by the simple or the opposite the complicated logistical nature of doing this yeah um I think that um you know in from my perspective most of the delays have been logistical since maybe mid 22 um I think maybe in the beginning of

The war where no one really knew what was going to happen um no one had really observed reactions and patterns yet maybe there was a bit of of um apprehension about surging certain classes of weapons into Ukraine not knowing if Russia would escalate or not that’s a speculation on my part from

From the outside I was having a baby at the time so I wasn’t really paying too close attention to that precise um weeks um in the runup to The Invasion um but you know what I’ve seen now um it is real the the logistical system that is

Built to get weapons approved and into Ukraine is very complicated the Russians have not been able to disrupt it it it takes time from when things are approved until it’s in the hands of a soldier or a pilot um there’s just a certain amount of lead time in there and I think

Sometimes that lead time things are actually happening in the background that we’re not aware of and they take time to get to the battlefield um that being said you know if I was going to offer um a mild critique um you know it was apparent to to to many people that

The Russians were digging in starting last fall um there were all sorts of versions of why there were delays and explanations for why there were delays in the Ukrainian counter offensive until June um but the the fact remains that by June 23 the Russians were dug in pretty

Well and had set up a pretty Advanced network of defensive system I mean this was being tracked from space this wasn’t a surprise um that it was happening so I I guess it’s um you know a question that I have is that if if Ukraine was being

Resourced for this offensive to the tune of multiple brigades and all of the artillery ammunition necessary to do it um you know why were Daren I think you’re cutting out we lost you I am I back I’m about that what what I’m sorry everyone I’m just making the

Point that you know if Ukraine was resourced for a counter offensive um why was it that certain capabilities like cluster Munitions or attacks which were important um were not provided until after that began um that that’s a a question I have final point on it Western Equipment in the hands of

Ukrainian operators and with Western support works very very well um that’s not the issue the issue is the numbers that are being given to them they just need more right the issue the issue though and you you posed the question do you have an answer to the question to the

Why um no I mean I think there were um defense industrial question defense industrial based issues that should have been resolved 18 months ago um we can’t go back in time now um and place orders in the past or initiate you know quantity improvements um 18 months ago

In the past but if those decisions are not made now this Dynamic yeah I think you cut out I think you cut out Again I’m sorry folks I guess this is taking out my Wi-Fi today all right um Eric to you same question sure I mean I I agree with Dara’s kind of framing that there’s um it’s there’s a difference when you’re talking about the early phases of the

War and uh sort of you know the fall of 22 onward um I was still at at CIA and the you know runup to the war and um for the you know several months after it uh began and you know there were real concerns um and questions about how far

Putin was willing to go and so you know from my standpoint um one can go back and and um hindsight is always 2020 and you can say well the escalation potential was never really there and Putin was bluffing the whole time but no one really knew that and you know Wars

Are fought and decisions are made on these consequential national security questions with imperfect information and at the time no one knew how far the Russians were willing to go and no one knew whether you know a Russian strike against NATO territory was completely off the table and Putin did warn of you

Know anyone interfering facing you know consequences the likes of which they’ had never seen before and again you can’t just brush comments and rhetoric and posturing off um it would be irresponsible to um you know the American people to just cavalierly say well you know we’re going to do

Everything we can and completely ignore any risk of escalation so I understand why there was some caution um you know in the early days I would say that once the war sort of took on its own logic and it became a bit clearer what you know Russian limitations were both

Capabilities wise and intent wise um I do agree with Dara that decisions should have been made early on um particularly concerning our defense Industrial not only here but also in Europe and actually you know the United States made some decisions to start ramping up production um the Europeans lagged for a

Lot longer uh and again there was this magical thinking getting back to Andrew and Eugene’s piece about they’re being shortcuts and the war oh the Russian economy will collapse under sanctions or there will be a mutiny on you know on the Russian uh side and the Army will

Revolt and turn against Putin or whatever whatever and really I think it became clear to a lot of people who are following this that the political issues between the two sides were so um fundamentally kind of um intractable and that this war again it didn’t just start in February 2022 it

Started in February 2014 and it was fundamentally over the sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine and there’s no there was no easy way to bridge these divides um and so it was likely to settle into this kind of protracted conflict and so you know again the critique that I would

Offer similar to Darrow is that um decisions should have been made earlier on to scale up the defense industrial base um and to put our you know the funding mechanisms and the whole policy framework onto a much longer term footing right but no single to you both no single weapon system provided earlier

Would have fundamentally altered the trajectory of the battlefield is that a reasonable assessment or no no weapon system offered in unlimited well we didn’t have unlimited quantities but was there a key that might have um no so there’s there’s not there’s not a Magic Bullet um you know

Answer here um you know and so I don’t I don’t want to engage too much in in hypotheticals on that point but I just go back to you know we gave Ukraine attack thems but we gave them 20 right um and with and with that 20 they were

Able to disable um multiple you know I think they attacked a few helicopter bases I mean that that was important because those helicopters were harming them in the opening days of the counter offensive um you know and I think that we need to ask ourselves why were we

Only in a position to give them 20 um you know if we’re if we’re in an era of great power competition and we have responsibilities to Nato we have responsibilities to our allies and partners in the Asia Pacific um we need to take a good look at our

Defense industrial base and what it can produce for us and whether or not it can pay the bills um that we need to pay if we have if we are called to we can’t run another war on credit and I I and maybe that’s too glib um but you know the the

Weapons that we’ve been providing to Ukraine have been taken from our stocks and we’re backfilling them and and not even doing that particularly efficiently um you know we buy ourselves Time by dipping into stocks and then we don’t make the decisions to expand our capacity and this is this is not um this

Is not workable for the defense that we the defense responsibilities that we have for NATO it’s not workable or viable anymore for Europe either um so there this war is buying us time as well to make some really important decisions about how we move forward and we cannot

Waste this opportunity yeah one can only imagine how complex this would be given events in the Middle East and and putatively uh what would happen if we faced a major challenge from Beijing um in Asia um I want to move on to the unaccessible but I’m gonna ask you

Anyway to assess the unassessable what what is Vladimir Putin thinking now Eric I would say he feels wind in his sails he feels like the war is um finally breaking in his favor um he you know the the fundamentals are good from his Viewpoint the Russian economy um has

Proved uh remarkably resilient to Western sanctions the Russian defense industrial base is ramping up um after the prosan muty last uh summer you know there’s no real threat to his power on the horizon neither from within the regime nor from society uh you know there’s a farce of a Russian

Presidential election that’s going to happen in March and you know he’s pretty much coasting to another six-year term in office um and you know Western politics is intervening and the narrative has completely shifted and we’re talking about fatigue and we’re talking about how long can the West

Sustain this uh and you know most importantly um the counter offensive last year which was you know a really major effort by the ukrainians and a major surge by Western partners of equipment and training uh the Russians were able to defend against that and so you know he probably feels pretty

Confident in 2024 um going into this year that he has the means uh to slowly grind down the ukrainians and to uh exhaust them and Bank on um particularly politics in the west and in in Washington uh especially uh intervening to give him a decisive Advantage by the

End of the year yeah uh Dar a thought on this one yeah so you know I I think that he spends a you know I don’t know his mind but balancing the domestic stability picture absorbs a large percentage of his bandwidth and you know this war

Can’t go on forever with the types of casualties that they’re taking today um you know in in a effort to encircle the ruins of one Ukrainian Village they’re shredding anywhere from 10,000 to upwards of 20,000 casualties over the last couple months I mean this isn’t

Sustainable either um you know so I I I think that he feels confident that the the West will will Buckle the in his view maybe they assumed um or assume now that we have an intention span of about two years or less um you know that we’re

Not willing to do what they’re willing to do to see this through um I can see this kind of overconfidence coming into their their tone and their language and how they’re thinking about this and they’re they’re basing that based on um very mathematical calculations about war

Math I mean that’s to to simplify it I mean they’re looking at artillery they’re looking at their missile production they’re looking at what’s happening in Washington and concluding that this is going in the right way for them and quickly um you know domestically Russia has issues and I

Think they’re trying to paper over those and manage them in the short term um you know I I don’t think that they can keep this intensity up forever from a domestic stability perspective their defense industry may be operating at a more efficient level but but this is

Having a cost too um yeah um let’s transition now for the balance uh of our discussion to U US policy I mean based on dar’s assessment and yours Eric there are Russian vulnerabilities so if in fact you know life’s about addition and not subtraction although in this case it’s about addition and subtraction

Because you’re subtracting from the uh from Russian resolve and capacity and you’re adding Pres presumably to Ukrainian uh resolve in capacity um what is at at an absolute minimum between now and November 2024 what does the US need to do in order to um take advantage um to Buck to Buck Up Ukraine

And to re get Putin to reassess to some degree uh his overconfidence Eric to you first sure so you know I think there’s a clear blueprint for how to do this um you know number one first and foremost Congress needs to pass the emergency funding because already the ukrainians have started rationing uh

Ammunition already since the fall actually when the initial emergency request from President Biden of 24 billion over the summer was held up during the ouster of uh former speaker Kevin McCarthy and now the you know 40 something billion in additional military and intelligence Aid which has a about

20 billion in budgetary support on top of that for a total of 61 billion um that’s obviously been held up over the um linkage that Republicans have made to some pretty comprehensive changes to our uh border and immigration policy so uh we need to get through that um but then

The second and I believe even more critical component is that we need to start constructing a much broader long-term policy framework um in which uh you know we provide we collectively the United States European allies our allies in the Asia Pacific provide Ukraine a long-term security Arrangement that can Bridge the

Period of time from now until they one day enter um you know Western institutions formally whether it’s the EU NATO some combination of the two of them and what does that look like um so there was this really significant document that was signed last July on

The margins of the NATO Summit in vus Lithuania which was a joint Declaration of enduring support for Ukraine and it was signed by the leaders of the G7 Nations uh in the European Union subsequently 24 additional Nations have signed on and basically they all pledged to negotiate separately and together

Under this multilateral framework a set of specific bilateral long-term security commitments and the goal there is to provide a more predictable and sustainable funding model so that Ukrainian military planners can understand what’s in the pipeline for them building towards a future Force for which there’s been much planning

Underway on the Ukrainian side and in the Pentagon a future Ukrainian Force that’s capable of defending the country and deterring against a future Russian attack and I personally wish that this conversation had moved a little bit faster since the villous summit but it sort of got held up by our politics here

And by you know focus on the kind of Crisis management um measures you know associated with the counter offensive and all of that but we’re starting to see the fruits of that um you know that initial document um start to Bear out uh so just last week the the UK prime

Minister was in Ukraine and he met with president zalinsky and signed this 10-year security cooperation agreement which is sort of a specific set of bilateral commitments that the UK is making to Ukraine uh over this 10-year period um that’s just one of these kind of branches in this broader tree um

Think of it maybe as a Lattis work of agreements that would come together under this G7 umbrella and my hope is that we can do a similar thing here and get a very strong us commitment but the the big part of this is going to be getting Congress involved because I

Think it’s not credible from the US side if we don’t have substantial inter branch cooperation um the White House talking with Congress leaders in both parties about how do we we don’t necessarily need to agree on the number for another 10 years because it might be

A very large number it might be very hard to project that number given that conditions will change but at least let’s agree on an honest process for debating this regularly and putting things to a floor so that when there is a majority of members of Congress which

I believe there is now in favor of supporting Ukraine the actual ability to vote on that is not held up by the extreme views of a very small minority which is effectively what’s happened right now right and it’s going to be Amplified uh at least the dysfunction is

Going to be Amplified because we’re in we’re now in the middle witnessed yesterday uh of a a presidential election season um is this a containment policy um Dara is is that what uh Eugene and Andrew called for and they Journal article and is that what Eric is essentially outlining a broader long-term containment

Strategy yeah I I agree with Eric I think that um you know there’s several initiatives to to have a future Force for Ukraine I’m I’m I guess a little more shortterm and trying to see how we can get them through this year on the battlefield um there there are things

That can be done and should be done immediately to position them um this year and moving forward into next year when they’re doing that rebuilding um for the future Force um right now they know they need to dig in um they need to go on the defensive they need support

With that and the goal here is to um be able to defend their borders with bellarus Russia and the front line and make it so complicated um that Russia does not continuously try to attack them and move forward like they’re doing right now um You Russian forces perform

And still perform pretty poorly when they’re on the offensive um the ukrainians are defending fairly well in areas where they’re dug in up near ABA and areas like that the exchange rate is is insane I mean the Russians are losing multiple battalions against you know very few comparatively on the Ukrainian

Side um they also need more air defenses and more air defense interceptors if they’re going to um defend their cities as best they can um I also think that it’s time to reconsider if there are any policy limitations about longer range strikes on Military targets inside

Russia proper um to to leave that um as a as a sanctuary uh continues to signal that Ukraine will be a a missile sponge indefinitely um so I I think that there’s there’s some dynamics that probably need to change and this is all in service of Ukraine regenerating its

Combat power so that they are in a position in 2025 to be able to more effectively contest Russian positions um this is all workable this is all doable there are options but it does need funding and it needs funding immediately right uh and again 2024 is not the year

Of another Ukrainian counter offensive it’s this sort of political military defensive posture with the addition perhaps intriguing your comment about uh long range strikes into Russia proper are you persuaded that the risk uh aversion that the administration demonstrated I would have argued would be quite rational given the numbers of

Unknowns and uncertainties in the first year of the war has dissipated to the to the extent that the administration will be willing to countenance these uh yeah I don’t know exactly where they’re at right now I mean these are these are important questions I mean this is not something to take lightly

And it should be evaluated um not in ignorance um and not in fear either um you know I and I think about the behaviors that Russia has exhibited against the ukrainians if they’re firing missiles that they’ve sourced from North Korea 500 kilometers into Ukraine why is

Ukraine not permitted to do the same and these are these are questions that should be picked up and and evaluated um you know Russia has vulnerabilities in its Force structure they can produce hundreds of missiles a month they cannot produce hundreds of missile launchers a month or hundreds of aircraft a month

Right no it’s a fascinating Point um I want to explore in the time that remains uh two issues one I think we could dispense with pretty quickly and that is uh the issue negotiations um Putin has been has been sending signals um most folks I talk to argue this is largely

Performative um and I don’t want to presume your your views on this but do you see any sense forget the urgency which is a critical factor in any negotiations so people aren’t in a hurry then the status quo essentially is maintained but any Prospect for any sort

Of negotiation not to end a conflict that would be of of value and and effective uh for Ukraine in the coming year Eric do you you know I think the issue here is a definitional one um sure Putin is willing to negotiate but what he defines as a negotiation is very different than

What we have in mind which is a give and take and a search for win-win Solutions and compromises right that um you know acknowledge at least the interests of the other party and what Putin is looking for is to dictate the terms of Ukrainian surrender he calls it a

Negotiation because he wants it to be at a table with the flags and produce a document and all of that but fundamentally he’s not willing to move off his positions that you know he wants control over Ukraine um so so I don’t think we’re going to get the kind of

Grand political um you know War ending negotiation that some people have been kind of hypothesizing about um in in the media um is it possible to imagine sort of uh tactical negotiations on specific issues you know we haven’t really talked about the Black Sea much but there’s

Been a lot of dynamism there over 2023 despite the kind of static situation on the front lines and you know Ukraine has hit a number of very important uh Targets in the Russian Black Sea fleet has pushed the Russians basically out of the western Black Sea and reopened uh

Export corridors out of Odessa could that be kind of codified into something that’s more of a sustainable framework um maybe not getting back exactly to the 2022 un brokered and Turkish brokered Black Sea grain initiative but maybe something new that talks about deescalation zones and kind of rules of

The road um to enable commercial shipping in the Black Sea I think it’s totally possible um but again in that case it would have been enabled by the ukrainians being able to you know assert a certain level of strength against the Russians and and reduce the um Russian

Ability to maneuver in that particular domain of the war so could we see that happen on other fronts um could we see it lead potentially to some tactical ceasefires I’m not really you know I’m not sure um I think it depends again on um the sense of uh exhaustion on both

Sides and I just don’t think we’re there yet in terms of either party thinking you know this is the end of the road right dared to you um any serious negotiation that would create any sense of expectation about a quote unquote sustainable end state would depend on change in the

Battlefield Dynamic presumably that is to say Ukraine making significant gains that might compel and Andor Force Putin given the vulnerabilities you’ve identified to consider or even engage in in a negotiation is that a is that a fair logic chain it is Ukraine’s position at a negotiating table is made much stronger

With the understanding that um you they are backed with American and European support in a significant and long-standing way um without that I don’t know what kind of negotiating position they would be in it would be a terrible one um you know is it possible that that Russia wants to

Negotiate um yes it’s possible that there sending private signals that are somehow very different from the public signals that they’re putting out which don’t seem very um negotiation minded it seems more like um dictating of terms um you know I would I would say though um you know if there are private

Conversations going on um you know our support to Ukraine should be about giving Ukraine agency and that’s um communicating to them that we support them no matter what um and no matter which twist and turns this takes or what road they want to take it down um you know whether that’s a ceasefire

Whether that’s continuing to fight um you know they’re they’re in the driver’s seat on this with us as supporting and I think that they should be told that right and and no no need to uh have this conversation now we’re in out of time and anyway I’m not sure it’s profitable

To have it a sustainable US policy in a long game which this is depends on a political function and a commitment on the part of the United States to understand both the urgency and the necess uh Ukraine may or may not be the fulm of Western Civilization but the reality is

Without American support on a sustainable basis this is going to have a very unhappy ending I wanted to I wanted to ask you one more question we have two minutes or so to do it NATO the meetings in Washington in July is that correct um former Secretary General of

NATO the head of zelinsky’s presidential office in a piece of Foreign Affairs argued that the only way Putin will ever acknowledge that there are limits in terms of his Ambitions on Ukraine is if Ukraine is made a NATO member and not five years from now now so just a thought from each of

You your own view um the pros and the cons of NATO membership and do you think that argument makes sense Eric you know I I do think that Ukraine’s eventual place is you know in nato in the European security system um I think there’s no there’s no way of

Going back um you know to kind of the 90s and considering these gray zones as areas of stability um like folks thought that there could be kind of a buffer zone that would provide uh security to both the Russians and NATO obviously Russia has completely invalidated that

Logic but I will say that there are very substantial um real hurdles to getting there and the main one is that Ukraine is uh in the midst of a full fledged war with a nuclear superpower that is occupying almost 20% of its territory and so there’s no there’s no precedent

For um but there’s also a lot of danger in um the idea of bringing a country into a military Alliance the basis of which is collective and mutual self-defense um you know when there’s an active war going on so I don’t think the conversation on NATO membership is going

To substantially progress at the Washington Summit but I don’t believe that that is uh an excuse to just put off the conversation on European security more broadly and that’s why I get back to this earlier point I made about this interim security Arrangement which could be very substantial you know

Multilateral and based on really really strong commitments that could be a bridging mechanism until we get there one day whether that requires political change in Russia or some other major you know unforeseen circumstance yeah sound reasoning and dare to you final word uh yeah now Eric laid out some

Really sound reasoning there um so you know yes NATO membership could stop the war yes Ukraine is now the most combat experienced military in Europe against fighting Russians um and yes with Western assistance they have um were on the way to you know breaking the spine of the Professional Russian army but

Where I get stuck is that I can’t see a path um in July for you for NATO to entertain a membership extension to Ukraine when 18% of its territory is occupied so that leads me to you know what can be done for Ukraine what type of intern security guarantees can be

Done for Ukraine until that time right but the logic is if UK If Ukraine in in N is in NATO during the middle of a hot War then NATO is at War and for all practical purposes so is the United States is that is that the basic logic

Chain that’s that’s uh yes right and and in 2024 and the runup to an election one of the most consequential I suspect in modern American history uh I I I think I know where the Biden Administration is going to be on that particular issue but look it’s been 45 minutes to

Real treat you’ve helped crystallize my own thinking with your Clarity and and your depth of experience and expertise I really appreciate it Ukraine may be out of the headlines for now but I suspect as the two of you know uh it will be back take care and uh all the best for

The new year thanks sir thank you