Dysfunctional Bosnia Wants EU Membership

In the heart of Europe lies a country with three presidents, two autonomous Entities, and a foreign official as its ultimate powerbroker. This is the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a nation on the path to join the European Union despite being trapped in deep political paralysis.

This analysis delves into the core dysfunction born from the very peace deal designed to save it, an agreement that has instead fueled several episodes of ethnic rivalry and gridlock. The situation is further inflamed by nationalist leaders whose secessionist rhetoric threatens not just the country’s European ambitions, but the stability of the entire Western Balkans. Can a nation so internally divided ever truly integrate, or will its dream of EU membership remain a distant illusion?

00:00 – Introduction
01:03 – A Legacy of Divisions
02:05 – One Country, Two Entities, Three Presidents
03:56 – Bosnia’s Internal Frictions
07:47 – The Distant EU Dream

References:
03:40 – “Parliaments and evidence-based lawmaking in the Western Balkans: A comparative analysis of parliamentary rules, procedures and practice”, SIGMA Papers, OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/e95bebb9-en. (see Table 22)
03:50 – “Bosnia gets government after 14-month impasse” https://www.dw.com/en/bosnia-gets-government-after-14-month-impasse/a-51785707
08:42 – The Economist Democracy Index 2024 (BiH score of 5.06)

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Footage credits: (via Vecteezy) EvaL MiKo and Dave Primov

#Bosnia #EuropeanUnion #Geopolitics #WesternBalkans #DaytonAgreement #PoliticalAnalysis #EU #Europe #Politics #EUEnlargement

Imagine a country in the heart of Europe, 
split in two, with three presidents, all overseen by a foreign official with 
more power than any local leader. This is the reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, three 
decades after its devastating civil war. Today, Bosnia is politically paralyzed by the 
same setup that has kept the peace. As a multiethnic state, its core challenge is that 
its three constituent peoples—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—hold radically different visions 
for the country. These competing interests must navigate through a complex government system 
that has replaced war with political deadlock. So, how can a nation with such a fragile and 
divided system even move forward? And how can it hope to join the world’s most 
integrated political and economic union? The collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992 plunged this 
newly formed, multiethnic state into a devastating civil war that lasted three and a half years. 
The conflict involved the nation’s three main antagonist ethnoreligious groups: Orthodox 
Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks. When the conflict ended in 1995 with the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, it had claimed approximately one hundred thousand lives and triggered 
the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. Bosnia witnessed systemic 
ethnic cleansing and genocide, which ultimately forced the international community to intervene.
The diplomatic efforts led by the United States, Russia, and the European Union restored a fragile 
coexistence between these three ethnic groups. Yet, the legacy of that period still 
shapes Bosnia’s political landscape, and differing views on the past 
underscore the remaining wounds of war. While the Dayton Agreement ended the fighting, 
it created one of the world’s most complicated and decentralized political systems. The deal 
established a parliamentary democracy composed of two main entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with a Bosniak and Croat majority, and the Republika Srpska, predominantly Serb. 
These two entities operate with significant autonomy, each with its own constitutions, 
parliaments, governments, and prime ministers. The state-level institutions in Sarajevo only 
oversee specific areas such as national security, foreign policy, and tax administration. At the 
top, a three-member Presidency represents the state, with one Bosniak and one Croat elected 
from the Federation, and one Serb elected from Republika Srpska. Crucially, each member 
holds veto power over any decision they believe harms the vital interests of their ethnic 
group. This means that any legislation that appears to challenge the interests of a single 
ethnic group is almost certain to be vetoed. This power-sharing agreement brought stability 
to the region, but it has made consensus nearly impossible. Unsurprisingly, legislative 
paralysis in Sarajevo has become the norm. To illustrate the degree of political gridlock, 
between 2018 and 2022, the state-level Parliament passed only a third of the laws put to a 
vote. That is an average of a mere six laws per year. And at one point, the country went 
14 months without a functioning government. Recognizing that such a system could lead 
to complete paralysis, the architects of the peace deal included a powerful external 
arbiter when consensus among the three groups is not achievable. The Dayton Agreement thus 
established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the civilian implementation of the 
peace deal. This diplomat, usually from the European Union or the United States, can impose 
binding decisions, strike down legislation, and even remove elected officials who obstruct 
peace. And it has done so in multiple cases. While some see the High Representative 
as a necessary stabilizing force, many, particularly among Bosnian Serbs, view it 
as foreign interference in their country’s affairs. The Office of the High Representative was 
never designed to be permanent. Its dissolution is even a precondition for EU integration, 
as it was only established as a transitional mechanism to facilitate post-war recovery. 
This is relevant because nationalist leaders have started to openly challenge and reject 
its rulings. Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, has been 
an outspoken critic of the Office of the High Representative. He has frequently called 
for the secession of Republika Srpska and labeled Bosnia a “failed state”. To bolster 
this position, he employs divisive rhetoric, such as denying the Srebrenica genocide, 
praising convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, and promoting a pro-Russian foreign policy. 
Although Dodik’s actions are the most confrontational, nationalist narratives are also 
present among Bosniak and Bosnian Croat leaders. Dragan Čović, the main Bosnian Croat leader, has 
consistently advocated for a separate third, Croat entity. On the other hand, Bosniak politicians 
like Bakir Izetbegović push for a more centralized state, a proposal often viewed by other factions 
as a threat to their autonomy. So, yes, the core rivalry pits Bosniaks seeking a centralized state 
against Croats advocating for a third, separate entity and Serbs threatening to secede entirely. 
Naturally, this cycle of competing rhetoric fuels instability in a particularly sensitive region. 
But recent events have centered on Dodik’s direct confrontation with state institutions. 
His strong rhetoric and calls for a separate Republika Srpska army have raised 
alarm bells across the Western Balkans, with the fear of a renewed armed conflict. 
Tensions escalated in April 2025 after state authorities attempted to arrest Dodik for defying 
rulings from the Constitutional Court and from the Office of the High Representative. 
In response, Dodik threatened to block the national government in Sarajevo and 
demanded the removal of all state-level judicial and police agencies from his entity. 
This domestic legal matter has taken on broader geopolitical significance, placing Dodik 
and his allies in Moscow and Belgrade at odds with Western-backed institutions. Indeed, 
many analysts view Dodik’s separatist rhetoric as being actively encouraged by Moscow, which 
seeks to undermine NATO and EU expansion and maintain a foothold of influence in the 
Balkans. By rejecting state institutions, Dodik not only undermines the functioning 
of Bosnia and the Dayton agreement, but also implodes any progress toward EU integration with 
political crises and fears of a renewed conflict. Bosnia applied for EU membership in 2016, 
received candidate status in late 2022, and formally opened accession negotiations 
in 2024. This progress was accelerated not by substantial reforms within Bosnia, but by the 
EU’s renewed geopolitical urgency to solidify its influence in the Western Balkans following 
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The journey requires Bosnia to adopt extensive 
EU laws, and progress is slow due to weak state institutions and political hostility. Key areas 
like the rule of law and public administration have seen little improvement. Moreover, Bosnia 
was ranked as the second most corrupt country in Europe by Transparency International, only behind 
Russia, and classified as a ‘hybrid regime’ by The Economist’s Democracy Index. These deep-seated 
governance failures are not accidental; they are a direct result of a political system 
where ethnic loyalties consistently override national progress and reform. It is therefore 
difficult to see how a nation, labeled as a “failed state” by its own leaders, can confront 
its severe socioeconomic and political challenges. While Bosnia’s path to the EU is officially open, the fundamental conditions for integration 
are not being met. Divisive nationalist rhetoric across ethnic lines creates significant 
political challenges in Sarajevo. For instance, support for EU integration is roughly 83% among 
Bosnians in the Croat-Bosniak Federation, but less than 50% in Serb-majority Republika Srpska. 
The country is now caught in a geopolitical tug-of-war. Western powers are pushing Bosnia 
toward EU integration while Russia encourages pro-secession Bosnian Serb leaders to 
stall that very process. As long as political leaders prioritize ethnic divisions 
over institutional reforms, Bosnia’s EU dream will likely remain just a dream. For progress 
to occur, local authorities must choose reform over the current cycle of deadlock. The Dayton 
peace agreement was an exceptional remedy that healed a fractured nation, but the country 
has not yet learned how to walk without it.