In challenging times for Ukraine, despite public appraisals following the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ten-year mark of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2024.
This webinar will provide a deep dive into current developments in Ukraine and show how Europeans can best support democratic structures, and hence a European path for Ukraine, whilst ensuring that it prevails militarily – as both will ultimately determine victory against Russia.
Against the backdrop of increasingly negative news coverage on the state of Ukraine’s democracy, and the challenge to secure military and financial support in Europe and the United States, our panelists will provide a positive outlook on the societal transformations ushered in by ten years of war and the accelerated changes brought about by the invasion, and the war’s impact on the Ukrainian military. Together with our panel of experts, we will discuss:
What do European leaders need to do to best support democratization?
How can military support be structured in a unified and coordinated way?
Ultimately, how can Europe be the best partner to Ukraine to win the war?
Guests
🢒 Gustav Gressel, Senior Policy Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ECFR
🢒 Lesia Ogryzko, Visiting Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ECFR
🢒 Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ECFR
Chaired by
🢒 Marie Dumoulin, Director, Wider Europe Programme, ECFR
Good morning and thank you for joining this webinar of The Wider Europe program of the European Council on Foreign Relations my name is mahula I am the director of The Wider Europe program um and I’m joined by two colleagues um from CFR um Leia oresco who is a visiting
Fellow from Ukraine at ecfr and also a fellow at the center for defense strategies in KF um and Gustav gessel senior policy fellow um with the CFR who’s been following uh military developments in the region um since 2014 uh we will be joined in a few minutes by our thir speaker Andrew
Wilson professor of Ukrainian studies at University College London and a senior policy fellow um with the CFR um we wanted to organize this discussion um in light of the double anniversary um of primier annexation and the start the actual start of the war in Ukraine back in
2014 um and more recently the um anniversary that was commemorated in February of well the second anniversary of the fullscale invasion of Ukraine um we thought this double anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the changes Ukraine has been going through over the last 10 years um and how these changes have
Accelerated um since the start of the fullscale invasion um think also of the Lessons Learned um from these this period um and the way forward and how Europe can help Ukraine sustain change and transformation over the next years um we have published recently um two research papers one by Andrew Wilson
Called Reformation nation which looks at domestic developments in Ukraine um and another one by Gustav Gress Beyond The War of Attrition um who looks at um military development ments and um and how Europeans can um best assist Ukraine to face um the war um I will give the floor to gusta to
Update us um on the latest military developments the Le Lessons Learned um and the way forward but before that um I just wanted to make clear that we will have a Q&A session um and so if you have any questions for our speakers please write them in the
Q&r um section of Zoom um and I will um try to address most of most of them with our speakers so gustaff can you tell us where things stand um and what what sense we can make of of of the latest developments yeah thanks a lot uh so
Where are we in the war and um what is the prospect for at least this year I try to cover that um you’ve mentioned the paper beyond the counter offensive um I have to say the paper basically is from last summer It Was Written uh in September after we did an
Ecfr study trip into Ukraine uh so some of the things that are in the paper have been addressed others are still outstanding um and I will try to give an up update Beyond what’s in the paper so uh the problem is the war is still in an nutritional phase
Both parties have difficulties uh resuming to maneuver Warfare on the Ukrainian side that is of course now extremely difficult because of material shortages as well as shortages Manpower but on the Russian side it’s equally impossible and I will uh later a bit maybe allude to to why and how this is
Playing out uh so the war for the time being is about attrition uh each uh party tries to to inflict damage to the other side uh ukrainians defending Russians keeping the pressure up by attacking and uh the sort of the end result will be who exhausts first now if
You look into the statistics of vehicles damaged and killed ukrainians actually achieve a uh pretty good level of attrition um roughly so an on average of 4.5 to1 what does that mean that for each and every armored Fighting Vehicle uh that Russia destroys Ukrainian uh the Ukrainian Army destroys four and a half
Russian armored vehicles and now if you look into kind of textbooks or military textbooks on the sort of ratio of superiority and attacker needs on a def Defender and the kind of um kills one needs to expect or the losses one needs to expect if going in the offensive 4.5
To one is actually a good uh attration ratio for defending parties so tactically uh with all the problems that exist in the Ukrainian Army it’s a mobilized Army has grown very fast um uh it has grown larger much larger than its mobilization structures were intended to be in 2022 uh and these mobilization
Structures actually came on paper into being in 2021 so they’re enormously recent so given all the problems that Ukraine naturally faces in the in the state it is it is still a pretty good uh attrition ratio the problem for ukrainians is that the 4.5 Russian Vehicles will be replaced uh the one
Ukrainians um it it is a tricky Affair um so let’s let’s run into into the problematics of resupplying on uh armored vehicles uh for for Russia um it it produces uh if you if you go into main battle tanks which are the most uh the tracked and uh
Sort of highest attention paid armored vehicles we can find on the battlefield Russia produces roughly between 150 and 200 new t19 m per year that’s not much um that’s still considerably more than all of the West produces in main battle tanks we produce uh 24 now 30 sorry now
36 lepar twos per year in all of Europe in terms of uh main battle tanks and um uh but still it’s um too few to to cover War losses uh but uh Russia also refurbished roughly between 800 and 1,000 older uh main battle tanks that are t-55 t62 t72 and t8s uh from
Storages and um pushes them to the front also included in Russian statistics as new tanks are roughly between 4500 vehicles that have been damaged at the front lines mostly by drones so not fatally damaged um and have been sent back to repairs have been repaired and resent to the
Front um on Infantry fighting Vehicles Russia produces roughly 300 BMP 3s per year new uh but it renovates uh roughly 1,000 bmp1 and bmp2 that um it draws from existing stocks um and the same is true for sort of roughly the same number applies to to
Empty uh Mt lbs and BTR so our personal carriers uh that are withdrawn from stock and rebuilt and sent into the war um now that is impressive the thing is how long can it last Russia has withdrawn roughly um uh 4,500 main battle tanks and roughly 4,000 infantry fighting vehicles from existing
Stockpiles The Still Standing remaining vehicles in out outside uh stocks are probably too damaged to be repaired we also see that there um cannibalized for spare parts you see that on the satellite imageries that weapon systems weapons guns are missing um that uh that uh tourists are missing
Etc so they probably will never be repaired to serve as as spare part providers um so that would give Russia roughly uh the opportunity to keep on this War uh until 2027 to 2028 depending on the losses uh however I have to say that while these numbers are of course
Very high now the Russ the Russian defense industrial complex started with the most easy uh hulls to repair from so I think these numbers will probably now start to slow down because the Russians are getting into the terrain of more difficult and more damaged vehicles uh
That are that it takes a much longer time to repair the West already is in that phase so that partially explains uh the numbers I will come up next to looking on the Ukrainian side on the Ukrainian side regarding main battle tanks in 2022 Ukraine Got roughly 340
Main battle tanks from uh Central and Eastern European allies uh these are leftovers of transition to Nato standards um basically t72 variants in uh 2023 Ukraine um CAU 450 main blood battle tanks roughly uh because Western types have been added to the picture uh and but the problem is that um
Secondhand Western main battle tank from from the Cold War are also now starting to become a scarce uh commodity and those who who are still around they are being repaired and I have on my radar Shad to be shipped to Ukraine roughly 180 main battle tanks for this year but
Then we’re gone and the problem is how do we sustain Ukraine thereafter and you can see 180 is considerably less than the roughly 1,200 that the Russians will get this year on Infantry fighting vehicles um Ukraine Got uh 323 all sovet bmp1 uh basically mostly
Bmp1 some BMP 2s uh in 2022 in 2023 adding Western infantry fighting vehicles uh Ukraine Got uh 600 vehicles and that’s a really good number uh especially as the quality gap is between Soviet and Western type equipment is the largest in infantry fighting Vehicles it’s much larger there than in main
Battle tanks uh and that was a quantitative and especially qualitative a huge Improvement um however for 2024 as the US is the main supplier of these Vehicle Systems and given that the US are out I have 45 infantry fighting vehicles that this year will come from the West uh arm personal carrier this
The situation is always better for Ukraine in 2020 2 Ukraine Got 1,520 in 2023 1,898 and for 2024 I have at least 785 in armored personal carriers shaded to be delivered into Ukraine um these are mostly amra Vehicles so Light Armored um Vehicles either leftovers from the global war on terror
Afghanistan Iraq operations or they are newly produced because they’re cheap to produce they’re basically armored trucks uh so you can crank them out at high number and at uh Fast Pace but the problem is that uh compared even to refurbished BMP 1s on the Russian side uh these uh armored personnel carriers
The MS are both in terms of protection and in terms of Firepower by far inferior to what the Russians have um so you see the problem the West has uh in sustaining Ukraine in the war over the time period Russia still has material uh and uh the thing is you probably um
Noticed the ammunition debate um the the the artillery shell Gap is the perfect example for a gap when all equipment that is withdrawn from stock runs out but you’re not yet in the position to produce or to deliver to sustain Ukraine on newly produced uh stuff so in last year Ukraine shot rough
2.4 uh million artillery shells uh but uh a very low number of that was from actual production the US produced uh last year roughly 300,000 uh artillery shells Europe produced 650,000 artillery shells but to Ukraine delivered roughly 300,000 artillery shells the rest of this impressive number was delivered
From stocks stocks are empty now uh production is not where we should be uh it will on the European side be where it should be in the latter half of this year um the US should have produced 600,000 rounds this year this should have kept Ukraine on the defensive
Minimum of um sort of together you and us of of uh roughly 5,000 shots per day which is 1.8 uh million rounds per year but the problem is that um given the difficulties in us they dropped out they’re now being compensated by the Czech ammunition initiative and it hope
I hope it will crank out all the numbers that are that are theoretically possible because that would supplement the US contingent but however the problem is um you see the problem that uh we are not yet there where we should be in terms of industrial production because European
Powers and US thought that the war will end sooner than it is now and this delay in starting industrial production um is causing us a severe trouble on the Russian side the Russians produce roughly 2.5 million shells um they import between 1.5 and 2 million shells of from North
Korea it looks like we lost Gustav um or at least that he lost his internet connection um and we still hav our third speaker Andrew Wilson so Leia I have no other option than going to you um you’ve been involved in various capacities with International organizations with the Ukrainian government with um Ukrainian
Civil Society in all the discussions about reform since 2014 um you’ve been also oh Gustav is back so so sorry I’ll I’ll turn to you later Gustav um if you can um take the discussion where you where you left it um okay basically I was just saying that the Russian defense industrial apparat
Ammonition we know of course the best numbers they are already cranked to supply UK uh their war effort from what they have they from what they import from North Korea and Iran they basically um scratch together their uh five to six million shells that allow them to fire
10,000 rounds a day um that’s that’s what they have and that’s why of course at a time where Ukraine gets roughly 2,000 rounds a day um sometimes even 1,000 round a day in in in March February they of course have a considerable uh advantage in in fires
And and the problem is the Russians can sustain this uh while we still need to crank up um our defense industry now you also basically recent news you saw uh increased aerial attacks and if you look into the aerial attacks uh Ukrainian air defense um shot down the slower part or
Most of the slower missiles so the Iranian drones and the conventional cruise missiles but um faster anti-ship missiles faster air air defense missiles adapted to a ground attack role role um as well as um ballistics and hyper Sonics that came in were too too fast to attack why that because of course
Ukraine has very few ground best air defense systems they’re centered around uh uh large cities predominantly in Central and Western Ukraine where you have the resurrected or Ukraine tries to resurrect its defense industry uh leaving cities especially like har and Neo exposed um Soviet air defense missiles are battered inter ing fast
Targets if there are there around at all um gun based air defense which ukrainians now have plenty of is very good at catching drones uh but everything that flies pretty fast and comes in really steep is impossible to to attack and the Russians are making use of this um and the Russians are
Importing North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles to make use of the lack of pet missiles uh to uh ctail not only Ukraine’s energy grid which which they did try to do now but they’re also going after the defense industry because as I said the West is insufficiently
Producing we are much too late in starting production we haven’t apart from artillery guns haven’t even made a plan how to produce all the tanks and infantry fting vehicles uh Ukraine needs ukrainians do that on their own um they have started an impressive program to to reestablish uh industrial capacity uh
And that will decide whether uh whether the war is worn or lost for ukrainians uh the problem is on air defense missiles these missiles are far too complex to produce them in Ukraine itself they will uh and remain dependent on Western Supply uh the Patriot is a particularly critical
System because it’s there in larger quantities um it is capable of intercepting ballistics um that makes the whole us drama and Saga very important because they are the biggest source of Patriot missiles for the time being the other thing is of course f-16s re um Ukraine is a country far too large
Uh to cover by groundbased air defense missiles in its entirety um Ukraine needs a fighter Force to keep the Russian Air Force at Bay they had since uh the Russians started to more aggressively use their Glide bombs which is April last year um and Ukrainian Air
Force tried to push the Russians away uh you see well you don’t see because these records are not public lished but um there is a higher rate of attrition of the Ukrainian fighter Force there are well below the 80 Fighters they consider as a minimum to continue their uh
Counter a tasks defensive counter a patrols Etc uh the problem is that f-16s uh get delayed and delayed and delayed we are now in the second half of this year as a Shadle time for delivery and and there are still disputes about the numbers that probably won’t be very
Large um the problem here also is that given the uncertainties in the US uh there are only elderly European f-16s from smaller countries who now without much of us Support also have difficulties in stemming the logistical and Industrial um uh sort of Corporation to really maintain this Fleet of fc1 16s um
So yeah from a European perspective it might be worth into looking into another fighter because that is a critical capability Ukrainian Ukraine needs to maintain to keep up um its its effort yeah and this is this is I know that the paper is a bit bleck um uh yet uh I I
Sense that in many European discussions there’s like a discussion that the war is already lost that’s not the case uh we knew that 2024 will be a difficult year for Ukraine we knew that last year already uh because of the transition in the west from sustaining Ukraine from stocks to sustaining Ukraine from
Production uh also because Ukraine has uh internal issues to address of one is mobilization that’s quite discussed a lot um to increase the uh to again replenish uh losses but also to increase the number of units to rotate units um and if you can rotate units you cannot
Only Grant your soldiers leave you can also retrain units uh and uh uh sort of training addresses then issues of uh cohesion uh of different standards um of experience uh amongst especially units that have been clocked together by various various um sort of rounds of mobilization before um but it also
Allows Ukraine to incorporate new tactics um new ways of coordinating especially new capabilities like drone reconnaissance drone strike electronic warfare into your usual uh way of doing mechanized Warfare um and and that holds sort of this kind of tactical Innovation that holds the key for Ukraine to
Success because Ukraine will not win the race for quantity but it has time and again shown that it can win the RO uh the race for Quality however that said especially from the West we need to Pro provide Ukraine at least with the minimum quantity to allow the
Qualitative advantage to play out if that doesn’t come about then things look dire but that’s up to us thank you very much Gustav and I’m sure there will be um a few questions to your analysis um I also think that the importance of air defense that you just underlined is something lesia
Experiences um on a daily basis these days um so as I just started um explaining Leia you’ve been dealing firsthand with all the aspects of change um that Ukraine has been going through since 2014 um you are now part of the biggest um expert Coalition um thinking about Ukraine reconstruction after the war
Um can you maybe walk us through the transformation that um Ukraine has been going through is going through over the this period of time um and the way ahead as you see it from a grassroot perspective thank you Marie and good morning everybody uh I would like indeed
To approach our Ukraine discussion from a as I call it an inter sectoral um lens and uh applying optic of of understanding the different societal groups uh inside of Ukraine their interaction and most importantly the the trust they enjoy amongst themselves because what um what usually happens
When you analyze Ukraine is that or I would rather rephrase myself in the very rare instances where Ukraine has been analyzed because let’s been honest up until 2022 there weren’t too many solid Ukraine units or departments in international think tanks or International um universities and uh if
There was an analysis of Ukraine that was rather uh conducted through a Russian or an imperialistic lens and the very few that actually remained uh were rather looking at Ukraine and analyzing Ukraine from I would say institutional perspective from a Viewpoint of formal authorities representatives of the
Government Etc which I think is a quite misleading uh approach because you basically apply a logic of mostly Western European countries to a certain degree countries with an imperial background and trying to apply it to a post totalitarian po Imperial country uh Missing uh much of what is going on
Under the surface of let’s say politics or or government institutions um not to to deviate too much into you know theoretical backgrounds but what what is left then in practice is what we have seen altogether in February uh 2022 when the international intelligence Community completely missed the point and
Delivered IR honorous forecasts about how long Ukraine as a country and Ukraine’s military would last um you have in politicians across the globe and across the whole political Spectrum quite surprised Ukraine’s politicians remained in place uh that Ukraine’s uh institutions and Ukraine’s State uh continued to operate in fact a very
Large number of Ukraine civil servants went to work uh on the 24th of February when Rockets were literally falling on our heads um and this is by the way a very good illustration of how from my perspective overblown the whole corruption debate around Ukraine is because had the um State institutions
Been in indeed so eroded by corruption then indeed Ukraine wouldn’t stand for for more than a couple of weeks as projected and finally you have um citizens and just individuals across across the globe who were very much surprised by the emergence of of a country emergence on
Their mental map I mean of a country uh that apparently has a very strong sense of national identity moreover are ready to fight for it moreover are even ready to die for for this um identity to to be sustained in Ukraine now from my perspective what what is really missing
And what I would very much recommend um Scholars and and you know politicians to look at when to analyze Ukraine are the two traits that have been there for many decades and I’m afraid will be accompanying Ukraine for for the foreseeable future at least um and the
First one is the in herited overwhelming distrust to vertical power to vertical power structures I.E to all authorities whether it’s the national government local uh local government to a certain degree local self-governance and as a result of it or rather as a um as a compensation of this
Uh huge uh distrust you have a tendency of ukrainians to fall back on uh People to People links um so basically interaction on a very uh horizontal uh perspective and we in Ukraine call ourselves sometimes a horizontal Society um when we’re talking about these links it’s first and foremost it’s family its
Friends it’s work colleagues perhaps friends of friends now what is important uh and what is very interesting from my point of view is that with every new crisis or I would rather say Revolution I’m talking about the 91 Revolution the early 2000s of the kuchma era um the 2004 orange Revolution to
20134 Revolution of dignity and then the beginning of the war in dbas and then 20122 the The fullscale Invasion with every and if uh if ukrainians are good at one thing then it’s we know how to organize uh revolutions uh but anyway with every uh new Revolution of Crisis
This concept and the um and the the actual trust between these people in the circle was very much expanding so expanded from this Inner Circle of just family friends and colleagues to basically everyone who is around you to people you would meet on the streets or you would stand with on the maidan
Sharing you know sharing uh Financial Resources donating money to people you have never met sharing food sharing um sensitive information for example and the speed of the progression uh of this trust has has been uh very uh very surprisingly High I’m I’m a fan of the world u values uh survey which is
Conducted uh um every every couple of years from from from where yeah every couple of years and um if you look at the level of trust between uh ukrainians uh the speed that it is is progressing is actually much higher and leaves up until now leaves many uh EU countries
Behind such as France or Italy or um Poland Greece um and and other EU member states uh which is quite fascinating from my point of view and with the 2022 Invasion this speed was even is still uh much higher now the second trait that I uh think is very uh
Important also to look at in Ukraine’s perspective is is also very much connected to the first one and is a result of the post-soviet era are the very weak institutions Ukraine didn’t inherit a um a solid and robust policymaking cycle uh one of the reasons was of course that Moscow was never
Interested in having strong public administrations in the republics and basically what happened is you had the policymaking cycle being conducted in Moscow Moscow analyzing the the problems trying to find Solutions well stakeholder consultations I I don’t think that ever happened there either uh but anyway ready major solution were
Already transferred to the Soviet to other Soviet republics and the only thing left that Soviet republics had to do was basically transpose it International legislation so basically rewriting the draft law and and voting it in the so-called uh parliaments uh this is of course a very perverted way
Of of how you engage uh with uh with public problems and finding policy Solutions um but in in a way those two traits the the distrust to Vertical powers and the Very we institutions led to a very interesting phenomenon and I think this is a phenomena that is often
Uh missed by by certain external observers is that the role of non-state actors has risen dramatically and the uh the state functions got to be distributed among these non-state actors which is very untypical and unusual for especially Western European countries where you have strong institutions being
Responsible for XY and z in Ukraine it’s very hor Al distributed among these non-state actors and what I mean under non-state actors it’s you know private um private sector business um Civil Society organizations uh the church and churches of Ukraine media think tanks political circles so you name it um and
What what you have is an interesting interplay between um between those non-state actors delivering all types of uh State fun such as for example law making you have very large number of uh of these actors and not just think think tankers it’s sometimes representatives of the business sectors or export
Communities or whoever who are being uh the the drafters of of different laws uh who are being outsourced by Ukraine’s government or the parliament um they are also then the ones that are pushing everyone in the political Spectrum to vote it to vote for these laws for example they are then lobbyists and
Advocates for it there are rep huge number of cases where external actors were basically penetrating the Civil Service um existing as support offices reform offices or whatever you call it and were responsible for concrete um reforms so reforms were piloted on smaller scales and then upscaled to the
To the um dimension of of the country uh what happened after 2014 with the beginning of of the War uh was that certain security uh that certain security functions have also been born not by the state which is from a again from a western point of point of view
Mind-blowing because this is perhaps the number one uh State function uh is to secure and and to provide safety of uh of its citizens and now with the with a significant number of charity organizations now to to which millions of ukrainians are donating hundreds of millions of Ras and and and dollars we
Are basically one of the providers of the Ukraine Armed Forces uh and and therefore also taking care of our own security as well um of course that that also expands to the the provision of social social services very often uh the public administration is just not having enough capacities and this is then
Transferred to to other sectors now you can um in the interest of time you can look at these features um as both as a weakness and as a strength I don’t think I need to explain why this can be regarded as a weakness but from my
Perspective in times of War uh this this decentralized distribution of power uh can indeed be a very interesting asymmetrical response to a very verticalized Russian society and political system and this is our response that uh that really uh provides us with with a chance for survival and
This is from my perspective the essence of uh of the resistance of Ukrainian of the Ukrainian State I will stop here uh but we’ll be happy to take any any questions thank you very much Leia and I can now officially announce that we lost our third speaker to technical reasons
Andrew was not um able to connect to our discussions so unfortunately we will not enjoy his contribution um I invite all listeners to read his fantastic policy brief about domestic developments um in Ukraine uh but I think we have enough stuff for a good discussion with the two of you and
We already have a couple of questions mostly on the military side of things but Leia you can also come in and comment um on them because I know these are issues you also follow um so by order of um from the micro to the macro questions to to put it that way
Um um to what extent can drones take on tasks otherwise performed by artillery as some in the Ukrainian military have openly been suggesting and how long would this work that was the first question um since the small F-16 Fleet will unlikely significant change the air defense capability of Ukraine and since
There are no free Patriots or um MPT how can Ukraine suppress the threat coming from Glide bombs Um and then two big questions for the longer term three big questions for the longer term um Can Europe alone without the US sustain Ukraine with enough military material in such a way that at least doesn’t not allow Russia to win or even Empower Ukraine for a counter offensive in
2025 um what happens if the W in the west if Russia achieves a major breakthrough for example in har for um Odessa in May or June um and last but not least um could you spell out the different consequences for European security if Ukrainian if
Ukraine loses this war um I think we can can start with these five easy questions we have some more coming uh but um yeah I think um we have plenty of stuff with these ones gustaff please okay I will answer the the the drones and the Breakthrough questions in one because
Drones are one major reason why a big breakthrough so far hasn’t happened uh the Russian army uh managed to breach Ukrainian defenses quite uh frequently but never achieved a breakthrough um and that is predominantly due to the use of drones so when uh when the Russians attack um
The usual attack is um dismounted so infantry leaves armed vehicles uh attacks on foot um sometimes they even dig entire trench systems just for the purpose of getting closer to Ukrainian positions and attack them um the armor fighting Vehicles provide fire support from a greater distance uh where they
Can be protected by a larger groundbased Jammers that prevent Ukrainian drones from getting too close to them um the problem is once that sort of when when they break into Ukrainian positions and then try to accelerate this uh I used the uh break in and exploit it into a
Breakthrough uh they um uh these armored vehicles usually leave the cover of uh electronic war of stationary large power electronic warfare systems and get on the Move now they have very small Jammers on their rooftops that um one year ago or like six months ago still provided sufficient protection to cut uh
The uh connection of an fpv drone so that it on the last meters would uh either crash land or miss the target uh but ukrainians have managed to program their drones in a way that they can if the connection um is jammed uh find their targets by themselves uh and they even
Find moving targets um and sometimes even uh sort of targets with camouflage on so they’re quite it’s quite a sophisticated programming job that they did but they did it and it has a quite a good effect and that means that once um Ukrainian drones get close enough to the
Armored vehicles they actually uh um at least damage them on the battlefield um and that has made it difficult uh and actually over the last three months despite numerous attempts impossible for the Russians to break through uh they can break in but not break through uh and that makes a very
Fast and deep maneuver uh very unlikely it might still can happen but it’s it’s it’s a quite unlikely event for foreseeable future um of course what might change yes it’s always a race between jamers and uh uh drones and the way drones operate how you coordinate different sorts of drones to actually
Get strikes successfully through uh the Russians won’t sit on their butts to just um wait they will try to adapt and we’ll see um but for the time being this works well um what doesn’t not work well is to keep the Russian Air Force out of the skies and um um prevent them
From firing Glide bombs um and this will get uh increasingly tricky the problem is because Ukraine is so large and the front is so long um there is hardly a a chance to to do that only via groundbased a defense uh and Ukraine has tried to at
Least put a higher risk on uh Russian air operations close to the front by using long range air defense systems in ambushes and trying to S of strike out individual aircraft the problem is here uh the insufficient cover by uh normal short range air defense systems um that
Allow Russia to fly that reconnaissance drones um quite deep into the Ukrainian rear uh above the altitude the service selling of air defense guns like Gard or like uh like shilka or or tunguska um and the problem is for all missile based systems that could shoot down these
Reconnaissance drones uh the stock piles are extremely low um that in turn means that Russia uh time and again uh actually uh intercept uh such air defense systems and as you train has very few of them this is a particularly high risk because you don’t get
Replacements easily um so uh to my point of view the only chance is to get Fighters um we might have to talk about other Fighters uh French have offered Mirage 2000 um yes It’s tricky because it’s a different strand of ammunition it’s a different strand of aircraft it’s a different uh engine it’s
All um and there are only going to be 30 aircraft roughly um uh because um there are few Mirage 2000 operators and um in Europe France is the only one willing to give one um the other Mirage 2000 operators u i I think this is rather unlikely uh but still you know better
Than nothing um the Brits are considering L TR one Euro fighters to give away now Euro Fighters is also the the beauty about Mirage 2000s is a very simple aircraft um uh it operates regularly in Africa from field strips that are challenging logistically and it manages fine and that would be an
Advantage to Ukraine because you don’t need a fancy air base for this thing you just need a uh slightly longer level straight uh piece of concrete um uh ight has also quite a fancy aircraft it’s difficult to maintain um grien Sweden is now in NATO um this
Might also be an aircraft I also this aircraft is meant to be operated from improvised runways and um the Scandinavian Forest um so uh I think that would ease tasks a bit because Al the F16 is a bit of a um sensible aircraft in terms of the environment to
Launch it from um uh and and then of course the appropriate missiles for this uh for this aircraft but I think we there is no substitute for aircraft in this um I mean looking qualitatively Ukrainian Air Force has actually done a surprisingly tremendous job keeping the Russian Air
Force away for so long with so few and so all the aircraft um so uh all the stories are he in the US media about quality of Ukrainian pilots and all this stuff I don’t believe a word of that I think this is excuse for political
Inaction um but yeah uh here we are say grippen Mirage something like that uh um it will we be able to equip Ukraine for another counter offensive U if the US stays in race uh this would be well possible for 2025 if the US not then Europe alone
Would at least be able to at least on paper theoretically sustain Ukraine on the defensive minimum uh however we need to acquire Patriots missiles for that effort beforehand and we need a delivery contracts um for Patriots from the US um it would also be uh convenient if for
Example there’s a discussion in Japan whether the provision of air defense missiles as a kind of defensive weapon um should be allowed uh that would ease uh uh the air defense race considerably ja Japan is a producer country of Patriot missiles um and would be a
Second source for this uh so it would be tricky uh but it is feasible um I would say some of the recent discussions that that hover around behind uh close scenes and are are pushed into the public with with this M’s um statements about troops on the
Ground and sort of also bit sort of behind is a simmering thing in the in the in the German Taurus debate is uh that uh Europeans themselves are not really United what to do if Trump wins and kind of makes sense Richie grenell to make a deal with Putin over
The head of Europeans and um as far as I understand M he’s particularly for that occasion wants Europe to be Sovereign and tell the US no um you’re not going to make a deal or on the fate of a European country without asking us um uh while uh another country that doesn’t
Want to supply cruise missiles their head of government thinks then well let’s wrap it up and we have done enough and uh communication there is going into that direction so yeah that will be of course politically an interesting thing how it will play out but in theory if
You look into just production numbers uh with the exception of Patriot missiles where we have to find a substitute um we actually can or could we have a lot of new questions Leia do you want to comment on the first wave of questions or should we go straight to
The second one there are a lot of questions for you too in the second one um yeah I can quickly comment uh just on my projections or feeling I am uh optimistic about uh the prospects of uh us adopting sooner or later the military aid package the uh the problem is that
Due to the delay in six or seven months we we ukrainians have paid an enormous price for this hesitance but sooner or later I I I’m quite sure the the US will adopt this package which uh which basically gives and buys us some time uh for for the European countries and for
The EU um as a Unity to mobilize mobilize resources and to uh and to ex to BAS basically have a for up until I think second half of 25 beginning of 26 um and I I do believe that this us Bridge can provide uh provide this sufficient time for for the Europeans to
Be a little bit faster in in delivering uh these uh these uh weapon systems ammunition and all the other Military Support uh what I do believe is key here is that that uh both the US and the Europe the European Union uh is concentrating on the air defense because
When we’re talking about air defense it’s not just in terms of military uh operations we are talking about the uh critical energy infrastructure the civilian infrastructure and we have to understand that the center of gravity of this war is Al also the economic endurance and this is sort of a very
Interl thing if Ukraine’s economy sustains we will be able to further sustain our war efforts if the whole infrastructure is gone Ukraine alone will have very little uh little little uh resources to to be left fighting with and the second one is the increasing discussion about joint production
Between uh Western countries and the and the ukrainians especially on the territory of Ukraine because it takes so long uh when you supply it and have to have to deal with all the logistics and this is again where air defense uh goes on the on the front line if you wish and
Uh will be able to to sustain to build these factories and then provide the the umbrella above above our heads I will stop here perhaps we can go to the second round thank you we have some more minutes and a lot more questions so I will probably attribute the questions uh
To either of you um lesia there are a couple of questions on the ukrainians perception um of the lack of common goals War goals in the west first of first of all um also on how ukrainians would react if um if Moscow had a political breakr in one key um Western
Country um for example Washington um and um and I think in terms of political questions that was it there is another question regarding um the 2025 counter offensive um and and what is realistic throughout 2024 I think this qu question can go to both of you whether Ukraine
Will try to achieve basically defending its territory and sustaining the attrition or whether there it can do more um in 2024 um and then there are a couple more questions on the military side of things um again the question whether Europe uh would be able to provide Ukraine with
The necessary Military Support in case Trump gets elected um or would Europe have to do more than simply provide material um I think that question is also about recent statements uh by maon and others um a question for you Gustav on the obstacles to increasing arms production in the west um and I
Think I think that’s more or less oh no one last question on um Russian strategy um whether it’s about um well whether that part of the strategy could be to exhaust the West the Western economy um the Western Industrial capacity and not only fighting on the military side of things
Um and one last question last minute question what would be required for Putin to resort to a further mobilization um and what impact might this have on public support for the West for the war sorry in Russia and um Russia’s ability to keep financing the
War um yeah a lot of questions again and we have three more minutes but I think we can over um go a bit of time uh so maybe 3 minutes each um Le shall we start with you yeah let let me try to kick in uh as
For the uh the question that there is no common vision and that um results in a very big frustration from from Ukraine side this is very much true that is felt on both the political uh level and also the societal one I I think there are two
Parts of this problem one is indeed this formula that we got stuck with is that not to let Ukraine lose but nobody really or almost nobody really talks about uh the actual defeat of Russia and we all I think uh very well understand that these two strategies are are very
Different in in in a way and uh as long as we will be on this track of not letting Ukraine lose uh I think we will be falling in the track of making this war um last longer and longer so I think we as a collective uh community of of
Thinkers let’s call ourselves that uh have a very important role to play in delivering these messages and pushing pushing uh the argument that we have to be resolved in defeating Russia not be a not not be afraid in call calling it defeat of Russia the second um the
Second problem with this uh uh with this issue is that from my perspective uh Western countries don’t have a very solid understanding of internal processes uh inside of Russia and uh don’t really have a robust contingency plan or contingency plans in case something would happen in Russia I think
The whole uh pran story was a very nice illustration how quickly we can be all collectively taken back by by certain uh by certain circumstances in Russia that nobody was was planning for and I think here again we are a bit in a trap uh
Like we’ve been in 90 in the 199 early 1990 91 uh the famous chicken speech of bush Etc where the West Was Not really uh in favor of of the USSR breaking up here we are looking at uh not necessarily the same um the same
Um uh breaking up of you know of of of a country although this this is what all ukrainians are very much hoping for uh but at least un certain unpredictable um conditions inside of the Russian Society in terms of the Breakthrough um moscow’s breakthrough in in you know Brussels in
In the west I think we’ve arrived finally at at the point after 20122 that we are talking about not just a regular you know armed conf conflict or certain tensions between different countries or Russia and NATO we’re talking about a shift in Paradigm where I well at least
I don’t see any way of going back uh um of the so-called formula vand of the different diplomatic uh efforts uh trads Etc with Russia and I think uh most of most of the uh politicians understand that when we are talking about any type of ceasefire
Because I I treat the Breakthrough as as a sort of uh push for negotiations between the two countries um and and negotiating a ceasefire I think it is very important for all of us to understand that this is basically a invitation to continue the war this will
Be just a pause uh for for Russia to to regain again its its military potential uh and I think this is very important that we deliver this messages and and try to look realistically at the ceasefires also looking at the lessons learned that we have uh from 2014 up
Until 22 how many uh different negotiations rounds have been how much Val violations there was from the Russian side um Etc uh as for the Ukrainian um uh reaction um I usually look at at the sociology which uh I must say the Ukrainian authorities are very sensitive about uh the the Ukrainian
Office of the President and the government of are closely following uh sociological uh studies inside of the country and it clearly shows more than 70% of ukrainians are ready to further endure uh War years of War uh no matter how long this will take so I think we
Have a very strong National societal National understanding of of what we are ready to to fight for and we have a trapped political leadership that cannot be be uh voted out that cannot be changed uh that is very sensitive to to what the the population is thinking so
They will not be ready to to go for for a very radical change of the policy that we have observed so far gusta over to you thanks a lot um so in all briefness uh what will Ukraine do in 2024 when the next counter offensive will come well uh
2024 will be a year where Ukraine tries to inflict as much damage to the Russian forces and to inflict as much losses as it can because that weakens them and prepares the ground for further counter offensive but I don’t see any major offensive this year uh there might be
Opportunistic attacks um uh but but I don’t see Ukraine in the in the position of doing that for two reasons first the issue of Manpower of training uh they are all long-term things that you can’t correct them in a couple of months even if Ukraine for example amends now
Demobilization law uh and calls in for another partial mobilization uh that would uh cure a lot of their personal problems but uh till you have trained all these people until you have then uh fed the people into operational units and the operational units have absorbed the neutres and uh
Reached a common standard of of qualitative um sort of Quality quality um across units uh will basically be at the end of the year um note that also defensive is much easier or at least considerably easier than offensive tasks and especially if you have new units uh
New recruits uh it’s easier to train them in their task and job on the def defense rather than on the offense um so that’s support the second thing is uh defense Industrial modernization in Ukraine itself which is holds quite the key to this uh to Ukrainian success um
There is a lot ongoing but uh most of that because even in Ukraine things are cheaper and happen faster than in Western Europe uh but they also take time uh and note that when defense companies announc that they will produce certain weapon systems it takes uh time till they produce certain weapon systems
At quantity take for example the bokana self-propelled Howitzer it’s roughly the same as a Cesar it’s produced in Ukraine um this howt was u in the Prototype stage and first introduced at the beginning of the war in Ukraine had um few uh few isolated systems now they’re
Producing it at quantity but it took that kind of one and a half two years to get the production of a system that you card in in sort of in already developed into full operational production that takes time uh the same applies for a lot of stuff
That is now done with the help of the West it takes time till that is available in quantity that it makes a difference operationally uh and we have to be patient uh uh uh this is in German there’s a saying from hooder this is if you do things quick
You end up having children um but it’s kind of don’t rush things that need need their proper time uh obstacles in the West for increasing defense industry is basically long-term orders um um regardless I mean that yeah there are issues of Supply chains there are issues of shortages of materials
There a lot of hiccups here and there they’re quite uneven across Europe um often it’s bad management uh also that delays things bad management not only from company side but bad management also from the state side where different agencies procure you have the defense track for their own armies that is then
Shi to Ukraine you have different assistance tracks um and there is a political disunity in where to procure how to procure people start to for the same thing start to invent different processes and they all compete with each other it’s it’s a bit of a mess uh but
The under the bottom line basically is long-term contracts um give you examp again an example on tanks the maximum production capability of K in Munich and producing Lepa 2 tanks is 200 tanks a year if the the the company is completely fully booked the problem is
In order to ramp up and to increase their production because it’s not only KV that produces the tank they rely on hundreds of sub suppliers small mediumsized companies that produce individual part for that they need first pre-warning time to gear all these companies up to full production and then
To justify the efforts and it’s not enough to just give them sub subsidies for them because there are these hundreds of sub suppliers that also have a a financial bookkeeping to keep uh to justify that you need a a multiple year of contracts where they produce at 200
Tanks a month so we we are actually in order to make that happen talking about orders of 800 tanks roughly um and we’re not there um and that applies to you know if you talk to infantry fighting Vehicles ground B air defense etc etc etc uh and as long as orders aren’t
There things don’t happen um yeah you’re Russia’s mobilization last question um uh I well I somehow feel the sense that they are preparing the ground for this pesov admitting that Russia is at a state of war is one thing uh Russia has um relied on money for the most part
Since their last partial mobilization to create uh the numbers they need to replenish losses and on personal their losses are far higher than on material so I thought I said uh one to 4.5 on armored vehicles on soldiers it’s the attrition rate ukrainians achieve uh is considerably higher 1 to8 to 1
To10 um now the thing is that uh Russia already doubled uh the uh Financial bonuses for people uh mobilized that sort of voluntary turn up to be sent to the front that sign a contract in I think beginning of March or end of February that is a sign that they’re
Looking for more people uh there’s also competition between the Russian oblas who recruit the quotas they prescribed so we see that basically those people who for financial reasons have signed up or are willing to sign up those have signed up and and um now of course there’s the pondering how to sustain the
War on the Russian side however that said uh a Russian partial mobilization which is likely for this year will uh uh under no circumstances create more than 400,000 soldiers because there is limit the limited amount of Barracks equipment and offices to train these people and yeah you can let them camp in
The woods but they don’t train themselves and they need equipment to train on and that is limited so we are probably going to talk about something between 200,000 and 300,000 soldiers probably going to be um mobilized this year uh instead of the spring draft that is that is likely will that uh increase
The Russian combat power um well it will sustain them um the problem is the Russian combat power by and large is limited by equipment uh and Russia had the ability since their last partial mobilization to to generate the soldiers uh they need to get behind the equipment they have one
Way or the other by pressure by using prisoners by mobilization by Financial bonuses that varied over the time being but they got the soldiers but the big thing for them that is really limited and where there’s no easy cut around the corner is equipment the more equipment Ukraine destroys the
Better thank you both for your interventions um we know really need to wrap up the discussion but I’m sure we will um come back to all these issues uh both in our writings which I invite our um listeners to to read um and in future um events and discussions thank you all
For attending this webinar and um we will be back um to these issues um soon have a nice afternoon bye