Life of Napoleon (Episode 21) – The Entry into Berlin and the Continental System

After watching Napoleon march into Berlin, Friederich must’ve been one sour Kraut…

This episode covers events from October 1806 to November 1806, with a look back May 1806

Spotify link – https://open.spotify.com/show/6ZUdt7PY54HR5teHxrMsJs

Music:
Franz Liszt – Les Préludes (1854)

Sources/References:
– The Campaigns of Napoleon (1966) – David Chandler
– The French Revolution (1980) – Christopher Hibbert
– In the Words of Napoleon (2002) – Philip Haythornwaithe & R.M. Johnston
– Napoleon (2015) – Andrew Roberts
– Naploleon’s Wars (2006) – Charles Esdaile

Upon the field of battle La Grande Armée  rested. Bivouacs were established where,   just hours before, vicious mêlées had raged and  cannons boomed. Bodies still littered the field;   the groans of wounded and dying echoed in still  night air. For Emperor Napoleon the day of October  

14th had been a trying one. Under his personal  direction an entire Prussian Army under the Prince   of Hohenlohe had been routed at Jena. Only miles  away, at Auerstedt, Marshall Nicolas Davout had   fought to a standstill an even larger Prussian  army under the personal command of the Duke of  

Brunswick, who himself had died in the fighting.  One-hundred and seventy-thousand Prussian soldiers   had set out for the occupation of Saxony only  a few weeks ago; now, a third were lost as   casualties and prisoners, and the rest were in  full retreat. However, from his headquarters  

At Jena, Napoleon was not yet to know the full  scale of the Prussian defeat. Hohenlohe’s army   was utterly broken, but the late Brunswick’s army  was largely intact. What’s more, a third force,   an uncommitted reserve of Prussian troops – 13,000  soldiers under the Duke of Württemberg – was  

Lingering in the vicinity of Halle. So though the  Prussians were beaten, they were not yet broken.   Erring on the side of caution, Napoleon therefore  only permitted the light cavalry of Joachim   Murat’s division to carry out a pursuit. Hussars  and dragoons streamed west toward Weimar pursuing  

The shattered remnants of Hohenlohe’s army. The rest of the French army was only given a   general order to pursue on the morning of October  15th, having taken the night to rest and resupply.   The three most heavily engaged corps under  Marshalls Jean Lannes, Pierre Augereau and  

Nicolas Davout were still, even after this  reprieve, in no condition to force-march.   The slack was taken up by the relatively  unengaged corps of Jean Soult, Michel Ney,   and most notably, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte.  Bernadotte’s performance on the 14th had   been poor. Marching between two battles, he’d  failed to participate in either, leaving Davout  

Out to dry and Napoleon deeply disappointed.  Vain and catty, but brave in equal measure,   Bernadotte was eager to restore his reputation.  Marching from Apolda 17-miles north towards Halle,   his corps caught the Duke of Württemberg as he was  making ready to withdraw. The battle was brief and  

Wholly lopsided. For 800 casualties, Bernadotte  destroyed over half of Württemberg’s reserve. Not   long after the Battle of Halle, Murat had reached  Erfurt, making as many as 14,000 prisoners, among   them the Prince of Orange and General Möllendorff.  This left only the main force retreating from  

Auerstedt. Soult and Ney were on their trail  force-marching north along the Elbe. Order had   almost completely broken down in the Prussian  army, and in the haste of their retreat, they   abandoned essentially all of their food, munitions  and other supplies. As Soult and Ney raced by they  

Found stocked-wagons rolled into ditches by the  roadside. So between the night’s delay imposed by   Napoleon, and a freshly unencumbered retreat, the  Prussian army was able to make good its escape.   On the 17th, the remaining French corps joined  the pursuit. Napoleon wasn’t far behind,  

Relocating himself and the Imperial Guard to  Weimar. Thousands of Prussian prisoners were   still being processed as Napoleon made the city  palace, the Schloss Weimar, his new headquarters.   The irony was palpable. Only a few days before,  the King and Queen of Prussia had resided here,  

Chiding on their generals and advisors to destroy  the French interlopers. And where were they now?   Queen Louise had fled Weimar in a panic, Murat’s  hussars at her heels. King Friederich-Wilhelm   instead had stayed with main Prussian Army, and  when the Duke of Brunswick caught a bullet to  

The face, assumed command just in time put his  name to the fiasco at Auerstedt. He was now with   that army fleeing north back into the Prussian  heartland of Brandenburg. But even this miraculous   escape was not fast enough. By October 18th, the  French pursuit was barrelling up the Elbe like  

A tidal wave. Rather than take command of the  defence, the King ran, abandoning his army.   The departure of the incompetent King was  an immediate improvement for the Prussians,   not that it really mattered. The Prince of  Hohenlohe was now in overall command. He  

Aimed to fight some rearguard actions to thwart  an easy French crossing of the Elbe. Ideally,   this would buy time until some sort of reserve  could be rallied in Brandenburg. That was the   plan anyway. In practice, the Prussians parted  like pam fronds. At Wittenberg on October 22nd,  

The Saxon populace gladly aided the advance  Davout’s Corps by disarming mines left behind   on the town’s bridge by a Prussian rearguard.  His plan in shambles, Hohenlohe had to abandon   the Elbe defence, and therefore Brandenburg and  Berlin to Napoleon. He was forced instead to make  

For the Pomeranian coast, following the Oder river  past Berlin and up to Stettin. Grumpy Gerhard von   Blücher was given a portion of Hohenlohe’s army  and ordered to strike out for East Prussia in the   vain hope that he could join any Russian army  that might intervene. Blücher certainly gave  

It everything he had, but his force was weighed  down by all of the Prussian artillery Hohenlohe   had offloaded in his panic. There was no way to  make it east, so instead Blücher went west to   Brunswick. Again the artillery bogged him down.  Soult, Ney and Murat were rapidly converging on  

Magdeburg. Blücher was only spared ensnarement by  this city’s formidable defences which delayed the   French. His hope now was to join a 9000-strong  Swedish army assembled at Stralsund. Murat’s   cavalry, followed now by Bernadotte, was not  far behind though. Cut to ribbons by French  

Hussars on the roads, Blücher’s force abandoned  what little they still carried and in scattered   bands evaded marauding French patrols. Most of the  survivors regrouped in Lübeck, while a fortunate   few did manage to make it to Stralsund. With all military options to arresting French  

Momentum now exhausted, the time had clearly come  for Prussia to throw in the towel. The first peace   offering arrived on Napoleon’s desk at Weimar on  the 19th. It came directly from Friederich-Wilhelm   and offered terms for an armistice before a  conditional peace. Napoleon read the appeal  

And decided it didn’t even deserve a response  it was so out of touch. The next day, Prussian   Ambassador to France, Giorlamo Lucchesini,  presented himself to Napoleon and offered   terms. Aware that Lucchesini was one of the  prime-players in the Prussian war-faction that’d  

Convinced Friederich-Wilhelm to invade Saxony and  wage war of France, Napoleon again rejected this   peace offering. Instead, as was his habit in tense  peace negotiations like this, Napoleon substituted   his own offer. In this case, unconditional  Prussian surrender. A vague outline of a post-war  

Settlement was also drawn-up by Napoleon in which  Prussia would lose her Westphalian provinces   and enter into an alliance with France against  Russia. Lucchesini obligingly returned these terms   to Friederich-Wilhelm, who was by now back in  Berlin and on the verge of fleeing again for East  

Prussia. More concerned about a counter-alliance  against Russia than losing land, the King was not   prepared to accept right away. He was under the  impression that Hohenlohe’s defence on the Elbe   had not yet broken and that there was still some  hope of salvaging the military situation. But as  

The Elbe-line sundered, Friederich-Wilhelm did  accept he inevitable. He conveyed his acceptance   to Napoleon on October 30th, only to receive  after a quick response – a resounding ‘no.’   By then, the French advance had completely  outpaced negotiations. On the evening of the 24th,  

French troops overran the cities of Potsdam, Cölln  and Spandau – today all suburbs of Berlin, but in   the early 1800s still separate cities. Potsdam  itself was the beating heart of the Hohenzollern   dynasty. Its capture, without a fight, was an  grave impingement on their authority. Though home  

To the centre of Prussian administration at the  Charlottenburg Palace, and the royal residence at   Sans Souci, the true prize, as far as Napoleon  was concerned, was the mausoleum commemorating   the previous Prussian King, Friederich-Wilhelm II  ‘der Große.’ Napoleon’s aide-de-camp and friend,   Phillipe-Paul de Ségur, recorded that the  Emperor’s usual intensity dissipated. Instead,  

As he entered the mausoleum and viewed  Friederich’s tomb, he insisted upon utter   quiet. ‘Remove your hats, gentlemen’, he said to  his entourage. ‘Were this man still alive, I would   not be here.’ Ten minutes of silent contemplation  followed. The no-doubt deep respect Napoleon had  

For Friederich’s abilities did not extend to  his personal property. Friederich’s sword,   sash, battle standards, flags, and even his alarm  clock, were confiscated and dispatched to France.   The sword and sash were to be sent to Les  Invalides. The little golden alarm clock,  

Meanwhile, remained at Napoleon’s bedside for the  rest of his life. Friederich’s flute – a fairly   unassuming black instrument – was left at Sans  Souci. Perhaps Napoleon could see propaganda use   for captured military paraphernalia,  perhaps he needed a well-made clock;  

But an instrument was too personal a thing to  disturb, and so it remained in the mausoleum.   As French troops completed the occupation  of Berlin, Napoleon took up residence at the   Charlottenburg Palace on October 25th. Keeping  on eye on the army, with the other Napoleon  

Supervised the occupation of the Prussian capital.  Back in September, the Berliners themselves had   been gripped with fervour at the news of war  with France. The same Prussian soldiers who   had fled from Jena and Auerstedt had, only weeks  before, paraded through Berlin to the adoration  

Of the crowds. It was therefore essential not to  provoke the Berliners. Shock played to Napoleon’s   advantage here. News out of Saxony was spotty, and  by the time many in Berlin knew that the Prussian   army was kaput, French troops were already  in Spandau and Potsdam. Even as they passed,  

Satirical posters of Napoleon still hung on  shop windows and tavern doors. There was to   be no looting, no repression, and indeed aside  from a de facto curfew imposed by the French,   life was merely on pause in Berlin. Harsh  punishments, up to and including execution,  

Were instead reserved for any French soldier  found guilty of looting or assault.   On the 26th, La Grande Armée made its victory  march through Berlin. Davout’s Corps was afforded   the honour of leading the procession for their  triumph at Auerstedt. Starting at Charlottenberg,  

The French troops paraded down the wide avenues of  central Berlin, through the Tiergarten, and under   the Brandenburg gate. Berliners watched on in  near silence, the symbolism not lost on anybody.   Indeed the symbolism was entirely the point, the  route deliberately plotted to pass underneath the  

Brandenburg gate, a monument to the successful  Prussian intervention into the United Provinces   in 1787. Napoleon capped-off the triumphal march  under the gate with an address to Davout’s corps,   and later reprinted in the army bulletin: ‘[To La Grande Armée]. We have reached Potsdam  

And Berlin even before word could arrive of your  victories. We have captured 60,000 prisoners,   65 flags, including those of the Prussian Royal  Guard, 6000 cannon, 3 fortresses and 20 generals.   And yet, more than half of you can complain  of having had no opportunity to fire a shot!  

Soldiers! The Russians boast that they are  marching against us. We shall spare them   half a journey and march out to meet  them! There we will give them another   Austerlitz fought in the heart of Prussia.’ Over the next few days, more triumphal military  

Parades followed, each more grandoise than  the last. On the 27th, 20,000 grenadiers   and cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard and Reserve  cavalry retraced the steps of Davout’s corps from   the day before. Polished breastplates and bright,  plumed shakos cut a marvellous sight. Napoleon  

Rode with them, but ahead of the main procession  accompanied only by his staff. He was conspicuous   for his lack of dress uniform, with one French  officer later remarking that he was worst dressed   man there. The Berliners themselves seemed not  to begrudge the victorious French too much.  

Their mood was a curious mix of despondency at so  crushing a defeat, and curiosity at the soldiers,   and the Emperor, who had inflicted it upon them.  There was even a brief moment of glee for the   Berliners as the Prussian Royal Guard was paraded  past. Comprised of cocky sons of Junker lords,  

There was no love for the Guard among the  Berliners. They cheered as the Guard was   humiliated by being made to march by the French  embassy before whose steps they had sharpened   their swords, goading France to war. Napoleon  also gave the Berliners a chance to excise their  

Complicity in the war by implying that it was  Queen Louise, not Friederich-Wilhelm, who had led   Prussia astray. A bulletin from the 27th trotted  out sexist tropes about women in positions of   power than played well to contemporary beliefs. Not all of the Berliners were so enamoured with  

Their French occupiers, however. On the 26th,  Napoleon had accepted the keys to the city from   Prince Franz Ludwig von Hatzfeld. It turned out  that the Prince had been writing coded letters   to Prince Hohenlohe containing details on French  strength. Napoleon was furious, and had it not  

Been for the intercession of his staff and  staff, namely Armand-Augustin Caulaincourt   and Louis-Alexandre Berthier, Hatzfeld might well  have found himself put up against a wall and shot.   Instead, the next day, this episode was played to  Napoleon advantage as Hatzfeld’s wife, Frederike,  

Was invited to the Charlottenburg where she plead  for her husband to be spared. Napoleon agreed,   making damned sure that news of his clemency was  spread all throughout Berlin. Less publicised was   the pilfering of Berlin’s historical artefacts.  Apart from the paraphernalia of Friederich the  

Great, Napoleon ordered the quadriga of  ‘winged-victory’ atop the Brandenburg Gate   to be taken down and carted-off to Paris. Then,  the needle monument erected at the battlefield of   Rossbach was demolished and also taken away.  Back home these symbolic acts would maximise  

The propaganda value of Jena and Auerstedt. There were still plenty of very real victories   yet to come too. With Berlin captured, any hope  of Prussia regrouping to mount a proper defence   was over. It only remained to mop-up the  last pockets of resistance. Hohenlohe’s plan  

Was still to escape up the Oder to Stettin.  But in his wake were the Corps of Lannes,   Bernadotte and Murat racing northwards out  of Berlin. Oranienburg quickly fell to the   advancing French infantry while the cavalry made  haste for Prenzlau. There on the 28th Murat found  

Hohenlohe’s army – or rather, what was left of  it. Without ammunition or food, there was no   fight left in the Prussians. Hohenlohe quickly  submitted to Murat’s demands for surrender   under the mistaken belief that over 100,000 French  troops surrounded Prenzlau. Ten-thousand infantry  

And 64 guns were captured. Only the 4000 Prussian  cavalry escaped, but they too were quickly   apprehended at Pasewalk on October 29th. Having  expected Hohenlohe to heave into sight any minute,   Stettin was instead greeted by Antoine Lasalle  at the head of 700 hussars. He quickly secured  

The surrender of Stettin’s city. Seeing this, the  fortress commander agreed to surrender too, even   ferrying Lasalle’s squadrons over the Oder to take  the arms of over 5000 surrendering Prussians.   Stettin’s immediate capitulation was just  a symptom Prussia’s utterly broken spirit.  

Perhaps the only man left in Prussia who still  believed victory was attainable was General   Blücher. By November 5th, he’d only barely evaded  Bernadotte and Soult’s Corps to take refuge in   Lübeck. The French were mere hours behind, and  though exhausted, surrounded the port-city. In  

Charge of 22,000 bedraggled soldiers, Blücher’s  hope now was to leverage Lübecker neutrality in   the hope that the Royal Navy would evacuate his  entire force to Britain. It was a fanciful hope.   Lübeck’s neutrality meant nothing the French.  Bernadotte and Soult jointly attacked the city.  

General Scharnhorst took command of the defence  with 10,000 men while Blücher made good a retreat   to nearby Ratkau with the rest. Before nightfall  on the 5th, Scharnhorst had surrendered. Though   under pain of punishment, Soult’s troops pillaged  Lübeck, inflicting yet more devastation on the  

Once-proud centre of Baltic trade. Bernadotte  was more successful in reining in his troops and   set off after Blücher. Despite the old general’s  reputation for tenacity and grit, his situation   was utterly hopeless. Blücher wisely surrendered  his army on November 6th. He received generous  

Terms from Bernadotte, who was all t-o eager to  eager to secure a quick conclusion. That’s because   from nearby Straslund, the Swedish army was on the  move, no doubt to Blücher’s aid. Rather than great   an approaching Swedish division with fire and  steel, Bernadotte opened up cordial negotiations  

With the King of Sweden Gustav IV. It was agreed  that the Swedes would withdraw uncontested and   that the French would occupy Stralsund to prevent  a British landing. In exchange Bernadotte agreed   to respect all Swedish property and law. Two days  after the Swedish withdrawal Magdeburg capitulated  

To Marshall Ney. The fortress had been one of the  few to offer any real resistance, but its meagre   stores of food and ammunition were quickly  denuded by 22,000 demoralised Prussians.   With the surrender of Magdeburg there was not a  single Prussian field army left west of the Elbe.  

Only in East Prussia were there any units at all,  most from border forts, hastily assembled into a   motley army of about 20,000. The military phase  of the Thuringia campaign was now over. Napoleon   had achieved his aim of defeating the Prussians  military, but as Friederich-Wilhelm refused to  

Accept terms of surrender, the war would continue.  Prussian hopes now rested on Russian intervention.   And that marks a natural point to pause our  look at the War of the Fourth Coalition to cover   some of Napoleon’s other pursuits. We’re well  across all of the international and diplomatic  

Developments throughout 1806, but not quite so  for France’s domestic situation, in particular   the economic side of things. When Napoleon  departed France in September 1805 to embark upon   the Ulm Campaign, he left France in the midst of  a financial crisis. In broad strokes, the French  

Banking system was buckling. It was bad enough  that the investment economy had dried up after the   collapse of Amiens, and all commercial enterprises  were thwarted by the Royal navy. France was then   also facing down Russia and Austria in what would  no doubt be a long and bloody war. Napoleon had  

Already drained much of the treasury mobilising  La Grande Armée for the unexecuted invasion of   Britain. During that time, the army had been  stationed in France putting severe strain   on local economies and resources. Economic  prospects appeared dim, and in expectation of  

Lean times ahead, bank runs were common.  This in turn forced the banks to demand   payment for the loans they’d given Napoleon’s  government – funds he simply didn’t have.   It was against the backdrop of this brewing crisis  that news of the Capitulation of Ulm reached  

Paris. The stunning victory restored public  faith in the government and thereby the banks.   A few weeks later when Napoleon scored  another stunning victory at Austerlitz,   the worst of the crisis dissipated. But that  did not mean the underlying economic conditions   contributing to the crisis had gone anywhere.  France was still under economic embargo from  

Britain, domestic industry was reeling from  undercapitalisation and the army still demanded   colossal sums of money. Returning to Paris  in January 1806, financial matters dominated   Napoleon’s counseil meetings. Fortunately, he was  lucky enough to have a two very capable financial  

Minds at his service. Charles Gaudin, a very  adroit minister, ran the Ministry of Finance like   clockwork. He worked hand in glove with François  Barbé-Marbois, the Minister of the Treasury. Both   had undertaken long-term financial reform since  their appointments, these reforms even predating  

Napoleon becoming First Consul, let alone Emperor.  Political expedient compelled Napoleon to fire   Barbé-Marbois in January 1806 as a scape-goat  for the recent fiscal woes. Charles Mollien   took his place in the Treasury. Established  in January 1800 to replace the Directory’s   hopelessly corrupt version, La Direction  Générale du Trésor – the General Directory  

Of the Treasury – was answerable directly to  the Ministry of Finance. The Treasury asserted   rigorous financial oversight over all aspects of  state expenditure and revenue raising. They also   kept highly detailed accounts and investigated  reports of corruption with thorough audits.  

By 1806 the Treasury was in prime condition at the  just the right moment. When Napoleon returned from   the Austerlitz campaign he was flush with about  75 million francs which had been obtained, fairly   or otherwise, over the course of the previous  years’ campaign as contributions from allies,  

Bounty from occupied lands, and reparations from  Austria. Deducting the army’s expenses still left   a solid 50 millions francs for the banks, though  this sum still fell short of what was owed. Taxes   would have to make up the short fall, and that  was where the Treasury and Ministry of Finance  

Stepped in. Knowing chapter and verse the saga of  political and financial woes that had toppled the   Ancien Régime, Napoleon was reluctant to introduce  any new taxes lest his support be undermined.   So instead Charles Gaudin opted to overhaul the  existing tax system by making it more efficient.  

Gaudin had begun this difficult work years ago. In  November 1799, the Directory’s inadequate system   was replaced by a new system overseen directly by  the Ministry of Finance. In every department of   France was established a Direction du recouvrement  des impositions directes – a Directorate of for  

The Recovery of Direct Taxes. Accountants,  provided by the Treasury, staffed the Directates   each of which supervised by an Inspector General.  The Inspector General reported to a Receiver   General who in turn reported directly to the  Ministry of Finance. Roughly three quarters of  

Tax revenues were to be forward monthly to Paris,  though after 1806 this occurred every ten days.   There were three main sources of direct tax  revenue upon which the French Empire relied.   The first was a straight land tax called  La Contribution Foncière. A product of the  

French Revolution, the land tax was levied on  rural landowners. When introduced in 1791, the   land tax raked in 240 millions francs, though this  sum came disproportionately from small freeholders   and peasant families. Reforms in 1803 and 1804  significantly reduced this sum to around 200  

Million francs based on more accurate census data  and revised estimates of what was owed. Though the   value was down, the tax was far more equitably  distributed between the major landowners and the   minor landowners. Another Revolutionary-era  tax on incomes was also maintained,  

But not with the same success as the land tax.  La Contribution Personelle-Mobilliére was chiefly   levied on towns and cities and targeted personal  incomes. What counted as an income was varied,   and year on year chopped and changed. Barely  worth the effort anymore, by February 1804  

The income tax was phased out entirely. The steadily decreasing value of direct   taxes forced the Ministry of Finance to  rely heavily upon indirect taxes. Excise   duties on luxury commodities like tobacco and  alcohol were the mainstay of indirect taxation,  

And they recalled nothing so much as the despised  octroi of the Ancien Régime. Though the Empire   referred to the duties officially as réunis,  colloquially they were still called octroi.   Despite their controversiality, the octrois were  expanded in 1806 to include common commodities  

Like salt, and even public transport or  the playing of cards. Though hated by all,   the octrois were indispensable to the state.  Between 1806 and 1812, when the value of direct   taxes hovered around 200 to 250 million francs per  year, the increased applicability of the octrois  

Increased their value by four-times as much to  around 1000 million francs. In the short term,   in 1806, state expenses for the year were around  700 million francs, leaving 300 million as income.   Nonetheless the public debt was still significant,  made all the worse by the near collapse of the  

Bank of France in late 1805. Speculating in shares  on South American investments, the Bank of France   very nearly went under when the bubble burst. Had  the Bank gone under it would have been a complete   disaster for state finances as not only was the  Bank of France handling the state’s public debt,  

But was also the main investment bank for the  commercial and political elite. Napoleon had the   old leadership evicted, along with Barbé-Marbois  as we saw, and replaced by a bunch who wouldn’t   pursue bank-oriented private investments,  but rather focus more closely on supporting  

State financial ventures. The most important  change here was the Bank’s right to issue state   bonds at 6% interest per annum, providing  another constant source of state revenue.   With all this money now flowing into the  French economy, whether from national revenues,  

War reparations or captured loot, inflation  was beginning to rear its head. Fortunately,   measures implemented during Napoleon’s Consulship  prevented the issue from ever becoming serious.   Having inherited a jumbled mess of metal coinage  and paper money, in 1803 the Ministry of Finance  

Imposed order by re-adopting metal coinage  fixed to a silver standard. Available in copper,   silver and gold, all at ascending denominations,  the rollout of the Imperial silver franc was   remarkably successful. The stability of the  currency made it very popular in France where   it quickly displaced the old, near-worthless  royal and Revolutionary currencies. There was  

Even some success in imposing adoption in certain  French-facing regions in Italy, Switzerland and   Germany. The result was that France enjoyed a  very stable currency commonly used not only in its   domestic market, but also in neighbouring markets.  Only the British Pound Sterling could compete,  

And though constantly devalued by increased  infaltion throughout the Napoleonic Wars,   the Pound did still outstripped the franc  as the currency of European commerce.   Most of these varied reforms were bundled up and  passed by March 1806 as a package. France was now  

Entirely out of the woods as regarded financial  worries, and indeed as we’ve seen was going from   strength to strength. So with short-term pressure  relieved Napoleon could recommit to longer-term   planning and his true passion project. In order  to strengthen the power of the French Empire,  

Napoleon turned towards a project of  Empire-building, the consequences of   which were to have profound, continent-spanning  implications. In this new ‘Grande Empire’,   Great Empire, nothing was to atrophy, or be left  to chance. Reforms at all levels were to assert  

Both the power of the Empire at home and secure  its interests abroad. As we’ve seen, Napoleon   was quick to sponsor and engage in major reform  projects, which we’ve covered in detail already.   Things includes everything everything from the  Code Napoléon to the Corps d’Armée system. All  

These diplomatic, social, political, financial  and legal endeavours fit into the larger scope   of the Grande Empire, forming the pillars  upon which Napoleon’s Empire rested.   In 1806 the only pillar that Napoleon lacked  for was economic. Despite France’s improved  

Fiscal position and success on the battlefield,  the nation was still one disaster – whether   military or financial – away from economic ruin.  Indeed, France’s military was success was at the   heart of this problem, ironically enough. Building  and maintaining large armies is tough, very tough;  

A problem that the Committee of Public Safety  understood all too well in the Revolutionary   wars. With the French economy in dire straits,  the only effective remedy was for French armies   to not to fight directly in the defence of France,  but rather to engage the enemy on their own turf,  

To make war pay for way. Invasions of Catalonia,  Piedmont, the Rhineland and the Low Countries   subsidised the costs of the army, whilst also  filling French coffers with thousands of tonnes   of loot which offset against the costs of war.  This economic pressure to go on the offensive  

Had never disappeared even after France had  prevailed in the Revolutionary wars. Similar   concerns presaged Napoleon’s 1800 invasion  of Italy, and more recently in 1805 and 1806,   the decision to invade Germany. This cycle of military success fuelling   economic success exerted profound influence  on the shaping of the French Empire. But it  

Was a double-edged sword, as we will also see  by the time the Empire’s successes are turned   to defeats. For now, in 1806, Napoleon’s career  is still one of uninterrupted military success   which has brought wealth and prosperity to  France. However, the cycle is beginning to  

Slow. Germany is all but conquered or allied to  France; Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Naples are   all client states. And of course with Austria  thrice defeated, and now bound by treaty to a   truce and alliance with France, Napoleon cannot  simply visit the bank of Vienna to withdraw more  

Millions in reparations. Now it’s not as though  these client states and allies don’t contribute   both directly and indirectly to the French  economy. Every German, Swiss, Italian or Dutch   battalion at arms is a battalion the French don’t  have to fund; and heavy demands are placed on the  

Client states for their money and supplies. Though  very valuable, these contributions are still not   the same as invading and simply extracting raw  resources or demanding reparations. There’s also   the issue really setting in here in 1806 that  maintaining the whole French Empire is far more  

Expensive that merely defending the territory of  France. The size of LGA at its foundation in 1804   was 200,000 soldiers. In 1806, that number has  doubled to 400,000. When factoring in too the   cost of regenerating losses and the raising of new  units, it becomes understandable why Napoleon was  

So demanding of his allies and client states –  without a strong enough economic base in France   alone, he had to extract everything he could in  order to make the cost of Empire sustainable.   So what was to be done? How could Napoleon settle  France on more firm economic fundamentals? Well  

The aim here to transition France away from  the need to extract resources from Europe,   and instead to become the economic and commercial  centre of new French-dominated European market.   And that meant excluding Great Britain entirely  from European trade. For the past 50 or 60 years,  

Britain had dominated European trade and  commerce. Britain of the mid-18th century   was an economic powerhouse, confirmed in that  position by defeating their only serious rival   France in the Seven Years’ War. An unbroken  supply chain linked Europe to the rest of  

The world via Britain, whose merchant marine,  whose financial and banking systems, whose navy,   was at the centre of a truly international  market. The upside of Britain’s dominance   of world trade did was not just bonanza income  but intensive economic growth in Britain itself.  

Not rich in the raw resources need for their own  economy, Britian sourced goods like timber, grain,   metals and cotton from both European and American  trading partners and from their own expansive   Empire. Manufactories sprung up across Britian to  convert these raw resources into refined products  

To be sold on. Generally speaking, British goods  were not the highest quality. What they were was   cheap and affordable at decent-enough quality.  So while French clothing, Austrian furniture or   Italian wine were traded as luxury goods, Britian  churned out in bulk common goods like shoes,  

Clothes and tools for mass consumption. Local  European manufacturing did exist, and Prussia,   Austria, France – all the big boys – did have  well-developed domestic markets for common goods.   But in smaller states, especially littoral states,  local industry simply never needed to develop  

Very far as British goods were cheap and readily  available. This is all to make no mention of the   trade of colonial products of tobacco, sugar and  tea, on which Britain had an effective monopoly.   The limiting factor for Britain was a connection  to oceanic trade. It was through European ports  

That their goods flowed, and so they needed  access these ports. For decades this had not been   a problem, even when France attempted to close  out European markets. France could raise tariffs,   implement mercantilist policies, or even try  to interdict British trade at times of war.  

It didn’t matter much because there was always  someone else who needed what Britain was selling.   This dynamic however, was gradually inverting.  Britain was really beginning to feel the pinch   of two-decades of French domination of the  European continent – in particular, French  

Domination of the Netherlands. As the de facto  entrepôt for British goods into central Europe,   ports like Den Haag, Antwerp and Amsterdam  were essential to British interests. Where   the loss of major trading ports in Europe hurt the  British, it wasn’t too bad for France. Already,  

France had through suffered the effects of being  severed from international trade. Apart from the   brief Peace of Amiens, French-flagged ships were  fair game for the roving Royal Navy. Britain in   fact had reupped their blockade with a ban on all  French or French-aligned shopping in May 1806.  

Suffering in proportion were major French trading  ports like Bordeaux, Nantes and Marseilles. Even   before the Napoleonic wars, the loss of French  colonial possessions had curtailed international   commerce. The effect was that by 1806, France was  basically weened off-of international trade. Sure,  

It would be nice to have, but not a lifeline as  it was for Britain. Agriculture was still the   mainstay of the domestic French economy. And  while French industry produced goods that in   better times might’ve been sold internationally,  they could just as readily be carted overland  

To European trading partners. The dynamic was  such that as France expanded, conquering land   or forging new alliances, Britain had fewer and  fewer European buyers for their finished goods.   Napoleon viewed Britain as ‘a nation of  shop-keepers.’ He viewed their reliance on  

Trade as an Achilles’ heel, and had done a long,  long time. Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition had been   justified on how it would harm British trade  into Asia, after all. The near-total dominion   the Royal Navy enjoyed on the high seas prevented  Napoleon from considering any long-range attacks  

On the British Empire. But what he could do was  close-out the end market for British goods in   Europe. Napoleon envisioned a Continental Blockade  of British exports. From Sans Souci the Emperor   promulgated the Berlin Decrees of November 6th  1806. The Decrees began by citing the various  

Real and imagined transgression of Britain, which  invoked ‘the first ages of barbarism.’ After this   came eleven articles detailed the scope of  the Continental Blockade. The British Isles   were declared to be in a state of blockade,  severed from commercial contact with France,   their client states, allies and Spain.  British subjects on the continent were  

To be made prisoners of war along with any goods  taken from British warehouses. These confiscated   goods would then be sold off with half the  profits given to merchants whose ships and   wars had been seized by the Royal Navy. For all the significance attached to the  

Continental Blockade, both then and now, it  was effectively only confirming a status quo   that had existed since the break of Amiens, in  which the British did not and could not trade   in French-aligned ports. But there is no doubt  however that Napoleon had grander plans for the  

Blockade than a mere embargo. Trade with the  continent made up around a third of Britain’s   trade by volume, so by cutting off access,  Napoleon could inflict serous economic pain on   his implacable enemy. The Continental Blockade  therefore became more effective if it applied  

To more ports, thereby providing Britain fewer  and fewer ports of call. Beyond areas he already   controlled or influenced, Napoleon intended  to expand the Blockade out to include neutral   nations. At the Treaty of Schönbrunn, one of the  many demands placed on Austria was that they cease  

Commercial contact with Britain. Here in 1806  the same demands were made of Friederich-Wilhelm,   contributing to his decision to continue his  hopeless war. Indeed, the expansion of the   Continental Blockade will from here on out be  the driving force of Napoleon’s foreign policy  

Since if even a single state keeps it ports  open to Britain, British goods will flood in   and undermine the whole project. That being said,  the Blockade, as initially implemented, did not   aim to entirely exclude the British. In fact,  trade with Britain was to be encouraged if all  

They did was import raw resources from Europe back  to Britain to be paid for in specie. Napoleon’s   logic was that if Britain still imported  raw resources to then be converted to goods,   but couldn’t offload those goods to Europe, then  the money spent would quickly dry up. This in turn  

Would force the British government to make tough  decisions to prevent rampant inflation, either   taking more massive loans, printing more money,  or in extremis, devaluing the Pound sterling.   With the French navy at the bottom of  the sea, or otherwise confined to port,  

The Continental Blockade was the only way Napoleon  could realistically strike out at Britain. As he   confided to Louis, ‘I intend to conquer the  sea through the power of the land.’ So if the   conquest of the sea was the Blockade, what then  was the power of the land? Alone the Continental  

Blockade was not conquest so much as area denial.  However, this did make the space in which France   could harness and build a strong economic  base by leveraging near-total dominance of   Continental Europe. Napoleon termed this project  the Continental System. Extending the underlying   Colbertian, mercantilist logic of the Continental  Blockade, Napoleon aimed to monopolise internal  

European trade by being the sole major producer of  completed staple goods – the exact goods Britian   specialised in. Already, the French economy  was self-sufficient, being as it was largely   agricultural. Industrial and commercial concerns  had recovered and now sought new markets with  

Which to trade. Leveraging France’s industrial  and agricultural heft, Napoleon now aimed to   compel other European states to view France as  their major trading partner, creating for France   a captive audience. This was not, however, to be a  European common-market where all trading partners  

Were essentially on the same legal and commercial  level. Through economic and diplomatic pressure,   Napoleon intended to impose disadvantageous deals  on European states that would see the French buy   low and sell high. Without competition, and  backed by the French military, France would  

Dominate a European market in which prices  on their goods remained artificially high.   All of this was great news for French industry  and manufacturing which from 1806 to 1810 would   grow in leaps and bounds. The influx of cheap  cotton from the Ottoman Empire and wool from  

Italy and Germany propelled a spike in textile  manufacturing. The army especially was a major   buyer of textiles as they required everything from  cheap woolen coats for the infantry, to finest   quality textiles for officers and prestige units.  Though production remained largely artisanal,   large-scale industrialisation did occur. British  technologies such as the spinning-jenny had either  

Been imported, and quite often copied, during  the Peace of Amiens. Now in 1806 the jennies   were in full swing. Textile works sprung  up all across France and its surrounds,   in Paris, Lyons, Passy Ghent and the Eure. Industrial development synergised with scientific  

Advancements, and indeed Napoleon’s old friends  at L’Academie Française, Antoine Lavoisier,   Claude Louis Berthollet, Jean-Antoine Chaptal  and many others, invented new techniques used   across multiple industries. Nowhere was this  more apparent than in the production of soda   ash which was vital not only in textiles, but  also in the industrial manufacturing of soap,  

Glass and paper. Nicolas Leblanc’s Leblanc  Process, invented only about ten years before,   allowed French chemical industry to expand rapidly  with Parisian sodaworks outputting a vast majority   of Europe’s soda ash. In the Iron-smelting  industry Napoleon’s policy of Ralliement and   sponsorship of L’Academie saw a confluence  of industrial and scientific interest that  

Drastically increased iron and steel output. This  fulfilled the army’s extensive demands. Returning   emigrees restarted production at Le Creuset and  Hayage ironworks largely to forge cannon. This   in turn led them to cooperate with scientists  who implemented the coke furnace in France for  

The first time. Ancillary industries too, like in  coal extraction and charcoal buring, benefitted   as well. For all the myriad economic benefits  France accrued from the Continental System, the   fact remained that it was a system that had to be  imposed administratively and diplomatically upon  

Largely unwilling participants. Very deliberately  the system was meant to benefit France first and   foremost, and were it not for French military  dominance, it’s unimaginable any state would   willingly submit itself to total economic  subservience. The artificiality of the Continental  

System was its greatest weakness as there  was no natural basis for it outside of purely   French economic interest. By 1810, the contrived  nature of the system would fatally undermine it,   but for now in November 1806, the Berlin  Decrees went into effect without a hitch.  

And that brings us back around neatly  to Berlin, to Napoleon, and War of the   Fourth Coalition. After establishing a strong  east-facing defence to protect Brandenburg,   French operations were on a de facto strategic  pause now that all Prussian forces west of Berlin  

Had been decisively crushed. It was good timing  all things considered. The month of November had   arrived with an unseasonable chill. Caught in  limbo between peace and war, and now assailed   by the cold, the Army’s willingness to carry on  was in doubt. Similar concerns were being raised  

By Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, now in Berlin  advising Napoleon directly. He conveyed that the   exuberant mood that had swept France after the  dual victories of Jena and Auerstedt had faded,   replaced by that all too familiar pessimism  that preceded a long-war. The longer the war  

Dragged on, the further Napoleon’s legitimacy  was undermined. A seasoned politician, Napoleon   did understand this problem at an instinctive  level, even if it frustrated him to no end.   Had he not offered peace to Friederich-Wilhelm on  decent terms? If anyone was to blame for ongoing  

Hostilities, it was the King of Prussia. Outbursts  and arguments were common within the halls of the   Charlottenburg as Napoleon and Talleyrand went  back and forth. Emperor and minister had long held   differing ideas on which direction France should  take. What were once differences of opinion were  

Further diverging into unbridgeable divides. As Emperor though, it’s no surprise that   Napoleon’s ambitions for a Grande Empire won  out over Talleyrand’s shrewd pragmatism that   saw France become a kind of primus inter pares.  It was in the context that Napoleon promulgated  

The Continental Blockade on Britain, a move which  Talleyrand opposed. He pointed out that Britain   was, at this moment, primed for reconciliation.  Prime Minister William Grenville’s Ministry of All   the Talents – a bi-partisan Whig-Tory government,  had been formed back in February 1806. Contending  

With worsening economic conditions at home, and  thus flagging public support, the Ministry opted   for an invasion of South America with the goal  of opening new markets in which to offload goods   which could no longer be easily sold in mainland  Europe. The force under Home Riggs Popham which  

Had captured the Dutch Cape Colony in 1805 was  now rerouted to the newly independent nation of   Republic of the Rio de La Plata. Buenos Aires  fell after a short siege. Popham returned to   Britain with news of victory and his assurances  that South America was ripe for the taking. Now,  

The upside of this for us that Talleyrand was  well aware of these developments. He was also   well aware of the Ministry of All the Talent’s  muted reaction to the Prussian defeat, regarded   as all but inevitable. Indeed, with the lingering  influence of Charles Fox still in the Whig party,  

There was even some excitement at the French  victory over Prussia, always an unreliable   ally. Elections were coming up in early 1807,  and it seemed to Talleyrand that Britain was   thoroughly preoccupied elsewhere, either trying to  deal with serious domestic woes, or devoting the  

Military resources to colonial campaigns. It was  then only with great reluctance that Talleyrand   agreed to back the Continental Blockade. We’ve been over Napoleon’s economic rationale   for implementing the Blockade and the Continental  System. Perhaps peace might be achieved with   Britain following Talleyrand’s plan, but it did  nothing to cripple Britain in the long-term.  

Napoleon was still determined to extend the bounds  of French influence and the Continental Blockade.   With a lock on Western and Central Europe, the  two areas of vital concern were in Eastern Europe   and the Balkans, and so Napoleon’s attention was  squarely focused on his eastern border. He had of  

Course hoped that Prussia would’ve accepted his  initial peace offerings, in which case they would   have been fit into the Napoleonic Grande Empire  as the eastern bulwark against Russia. However,   Friederich-Wilhelm’s intransigence suggested  that this approach would not work. There was no  

Way he’d be like Emperor Francis I of Austria. For  Friederich to submit would to accept a peace that   put him in conflict with Russia and made him a  client-King. So if Prussia could not serve as the   Empire’s eastern bulwark, who would? The answer,  as it turned out, had been right there the entire  

Time. LGA was already a very multinational force.  There were Swiss Regiments, Italian regiments from   the Kingdom of Italy, from Naples, and German  regiments from the Confederation and allies in   Baden, Bavaria and elsewhere. Making up a small  but consistent contribution was Poland. Since  

The first days the French Revolutionary  Wars, and then the Wars of the Coalition,   France had benefitted from a steady stream of  Polish recruits. Patriotic Polish expatriates,   expelled from Poland after 1794’s Rebellion,  found refuge in France, with many willing to  

Take up arms. In 1797, the Polish Legions were  regularised in French and Italian service. Poles,   and often as not Lithuanians, Hungarians, Czechs  and Slovaks, taken as prisoners from the Austrian,   Prussian and Russian armies, were offered freedom  for service. The result was that, by 1805,  

Napoleon had 27,000 to 30,000 Eastern European  soldiers in his Army. Most of this number was   made up of Poles, which is a truly impressive feat  since Poland had not been an independent state   since the Third Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian  Commonwealth in 1795. Many Poles, proud of their  

Novel Commonwealth, fought hard to keep their  independence, and then revolted against foreign   rule. Polish Revolutionaries like Tadeusz  Kosciuszko, Henryk Dabrowski and Prince Josef   Pontianowski launched a rebellion in 1794. It was  crushed ruthlessly Marshall Suvorov of the Russian   Empire. Afterwards many Poles who had fought  reconciled themselves to partition. Pontianowksi,  

For example, was wooed by the Prussians and became  a pliant subject even though he was once the heir   the whole of Poland. But the radicals would not  surrender. They were the ones who fled west to   France to form the basis of the Polish legions. Despite defeat and partition, the flicker of  

Polish nationhood was not snuffed out then even  here in 1806. Independence was still the goal of   the Polish expatriates, even if their composition  had changed since 1794. The initial influx of   Poles consisted of patriots whose revolutionary  politics harmonised with those of the French  

Revolutionaries. Of course, as France had  descended further in authoritarianism, and then   in 1804 done away with the Republic entirely to  become and Empire, many Poles were disillusioned.   They no longer saw France as a kindred nation, but  a more traditional ally, and more specifically,  

A vehicle with which to achieve Polish nationhood.  This endpoint came clearly into focus the further   Napoleon pushed into Germany. The Emperor was  under a lot of pressure from Poles within the army   to lay out a plan for Polish independence. Henryk  Dabrowski was the most strident of these voices,  

And offered numerous ideas and as to how to  achieve this end, even if they fell on deaf ears.   Napoleon was, as was universal among the French  elite, overtly sympathetic to the Polish cause.   In private, however, he placed little stock in  Poland and so refused to adopt Polish independence  

As a policy position for the longest time. Simply  put, he was not willing to imperil relations with   Prussia, Austria and Russia in times of peace  by endorsing the partial dismemberment of their   territories. And even when France was at war with  these powers, a Polish independence was off the  

Table so that Napoleon would not have to make the  hard sell for a Polish nation. Even if he did,   it was hard for him see how a free Poland was all  that helpful. No doubt Poland would be an ally  

After peace was signed, but an effective one not  so much. The Polish legions would return home to   defend a homeland that was surrounded on all  sides by enemies eager to reconquer their lost   Polish claims, and no doubt France would be drawn  into this war too. What began to tip the balance,  

However, and start to chip away at Napoleon’s  hesitance was manpower shortfall in the main   French army. He’d already called up the classe of  1806 a year early, meaning that he was effectively   borrowing soldiers from the future. With peace  nowhere in sight, the manpower situation could  

Turn dire quickly. An independent Poland could  be the answer to this problem. A friendly,   populous nation already opposed to France’s  enemies, that was already integrated into the   French army, could provide an untapped source of  recruits. What’s more now that France actually  

Did mostly border Poland, direct military  support was not the issue it once was.   With one ally in his back pocket, Napoleon  moved quickly to make a second in Selim III,   Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Relations between  France and the Ottomans had mellowed since the  

Egyptian Campaign largely because they shared  enemies in Russia and Austria. After the Battle   of Austerlitz, Napoleon turned on the charms,  and through his ambassadors to Istanbul, Horace   Sébastiani and Guillaume Brune, gradually chipped  away at Ottoman neutrality. Though inclined to be   standoffish, Selim’s apt calculation was  that Russia, expansionistic and zealous,  

Was an existential threat much more imposing  than France. Napoleon had conquered Istria and   Dalmatia, and promised to compensate Austria  with Ottoman Territory, but these threats were   far less immediate than Russia’s very direct  claims to the Eastern Mediterranean and the  

Balkans. An alliance of convenience formed. Selim  broke his treaty of friendship with the Russians   in 1798 to side with France. Russian shipping was  blocked through the Dardanelles, and Napoleon even   recognised as a padishah. In return, Selim was  given carte blanche to act as he pleased in the  

Balkans. In the main that meant reasserting  Ottoman authority. Serbia was in revolt,   the Greeks were agitating for Independence, but  worst of all, Wallachia and Moldavia were straying   from the Turkish orbit. The Eastern Orthodox  rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia – Constantine   Ypsilanti and Simon Muruzi respectively  – though nominally the subjects of Selim,  

Took their cues instead from Russia. This system  was formalised in 1802 with a concordat between   the Ottomans and Russia in which the Ottomans  remained the lords of Wallachia and Moldavia,   but the Russians chose the rulers. This  state of affairs was broken in August 1806  

When Selim deposed Russia’s chosen rulers. Yet  another Russo-Turkish war loomed. Russia was   only prevented from immediately invading by  France’s lightning-fast Thuringia campaign.   Tsar Alexander expected to be sipping  tea in Istanbul that November. Instead,   his army was gathering in Poland ready to defend  against Napoleon’s anticipated eastwards strike.  

And that punch was well in the making. On November  2nd the first French troops had marched from   Brandenburg to Posen to take up advanced positions  east of Berlin. In so doing, LGA had crossed the   ancient border from Germany into Poland. In search  of military and economic support, Emperor Napoleon  

Was determined to see Poland returned to the  concert of powers as a client state. The fates   of France and Poland were now tightly bound.  With his new-found ally, Napoleon then hoped   to claim the victory that been denied to him by  Friederich-Wilhelm in the aftermath of Jena and  

Auerstedt. Had Napoleon not, after all, promised  his army an Austerlitz out east. Leveraging the   full might the French Empire, the Emperor would  assert his will over the Kingdom of Prussia and   their Russian allies, pruning the thorns in his  side with his most ambitious campaign yet.